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vAbstract
A Computer Network Model for the Evaluation of Moving Target Network Defense
Mechanisms
Benjamin Fredrick Wheeler
Supervising Professor: Dr. Shanchieh Jay Yang
In order to combat the increasing complexity of cyber attacks, a new category of cyber
defense called moving target network defense has been the focus of a significant amount of
work. Moving target network defense mechanisms aim to protect networks by modifying
their attributes in order to confuse would-be attackers. Currently, the majority of the exist-
ing mechanisms are purely theoretical and have been the subject of minimal performance
analysis. There has also been almost no effort to perform comparative analysis of different
techniques. As a result, there is a great need for a method of modeling different mecha-
nisms within a single system in order to conduct comprehensive, comparative performance
analysis.
This work develops the framework of a system called Dynamic Virtual Terrain (DVT),
which can be used for comparative analysis of moving target network defense mechanisms
under identical conditions. DVT models network topology using nodes, which represent
members of a network, and access permissions, which describe the connectivity of the
network. DVT also defines a generic moving target network defense algorithm that can
be extended in order to implement a hierarchy of techniques. An implementation of DVT
is created in order to perform experiments with IP address hopping, port hopping, and
dynamic firewall mechanisms in a cyber attack simulation environment. Attack scenarios
are developed to evaluate the performance of the mechanisms under identical conditions,
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
This work develops a computer network model that supports the use of Moving Target
Network Defense Mechanisms (MTNDMs), techniques intended to protect a computer
network against cyber attacks by modifying the state of the network in some way. The
model is generic in order to support any network configuration, and a general algorithm for
MTNDMs is developed in order to allow any technique to be implemented. The model,
called Dynamic Virtual Terrain (DVT), is then implemented in the form of a plug-in for a
cyber attack simulator. The resulting system is used to simulate the results of cyber attacks
on computer networks that use MTNDMs in order to evaluate the effectiveness of those
MTNDMs using established metrics.
1.1 Background
Cyber defense refers to actions taken in order to protect a computer network against ma-
licious behavior. Examples of cyber defense techniques include firewalls, which manage
incoming and outgoing traffic, and data encryption, which helps to prevent unauthorized
parties from acquiring sensitive information. However, due to the increasing sophistication
of cyber attacks in recent years, there is a need for techniques to be developed that can pro-
vide better protection than these static techniques. As a result, much work has been done in
order to develop MTNDMs, which achieve protection against cyber attacks by modifying
attributes of the networks the protect in order to create moving targets.
Two common categories of MTNDMs are port hopping and IP address hopping. Port
hopping involves periodically changing which ports are in use by services on machines
in a network [1]. The new ports are chosen using a function, which may be time-based
2or pseudorandom. IP address hopping involves periodically changing the IP addresses
of machines in the network in a similar manner [2]. These techniques are effective in
increasing network security because when they are active and an attacker discovers an IP
address or port that is in use, the attacker must act quickly in order to compromise the
discovered asset before its attributes are changed. If the attacker is not quick enough and
the hopping algorithm modifies the discovered attribute before it can be compromised, the
attacker will be forced to start over and attempt to discover a new port or IP address. These
techniques are also effective against Denial-of-Service (DoS) and Distributed Denial-of-
Service (DDoS) attacks for this reason.
Dynamic firewalls are another category of MTNDMs. Firewalls are used in computer
networks to improve security through the use of traffic policies, which specify rules that can
be used to determine whether traffic should be allowed into the network or blocked. Be-
cause the performance and security of firewalls is significantly influenced by the structure
of their policies, a large amount of work has been done in the area of firewall policy opti-
mization [3]. These techniques can be divided into two groups based on their objectives.
The first group, matching optimization techniques, aims to minimize the amount of time
needed to match normal network traffic to firewall rules. The second group, early rejection
techniques, aims to maximize the amount of unwanted traffic that is filtered out by the fire-
wall while also minimizing the number of rules needed in the firewall policy. These groups
can be broken down further based on properties such as complexity and limitations. Re-
gardless of classification, dynamic firewall policy management techniques are self-adaptive
in nature so that the performance improvement always outweighs the overhead required to
implement the technique.
Two other possible categories of MTNDMs are dynamic network topology mutation
and dynamic cryptographic key assignment. Network topology refers to the arrangement
of and connections between the nodes in a network. Dynamically changing the way a
network’s nodes are connected could make it significantly more difficult for a potential at-
tacker to navigate through the network in order to reach a target. At the same time, there is
a large amount of overhead associated with rearranging an entire network. Cryptographic
3keys are used for a variety of applications, including data encryption and decryption and
message authentication. These techniques are used to keep data and communications pri-
vate, but if a malicious party is able to gain access to a valid key, any information that is
encrypted using that key is compromised. Dynamic cryptographic key assignment algo-
rithms could potentially mitigate this risk, but the process of reassigning keys also requires
a lot of overhead.
1.2 Related Work
1.2.1 Cyber Attack Simulation
Simulation is a useful tool for many applications because it allows for the analysis of how
changing certain parameters will impact the system. In recent years, the field of cyber
defense has begun to take advantage of simulating cyber attacks in order to determine how
different types of attacks progress through different types of networks [4]. By evaluating
the ground truth results of cyber attack simulations, the major vulnerabilities in a network
can be identified and actions can be taken to improve the security of the network. However,
in order for the results of a cyber attack simulation to be valid and useful, the definition of
the network and the attacker characteristics must be as realistic as possible. If the defined
network does not match the actual network, or if the characteristics of the defined attacker
do not reflect plausible characteristics of a real attacker, the results of the simulation will
be meaningless.
Cohen [4] developed one of the earliest cyber attack simulators in 1999. This simulator
is driven by a network model and a cause and effect model for processing threats, cyber
attacks, and defenses. The cause and effect model is based on 37 classes of threats, 94
classes of attack mechanisms, and 140 classes of protective mechanisms, interlinked in a
database in order to associate threats with related attacks and attacks with relevant defenses.
The database also links threats, attacks, and defenses with other characteristics that may be
important to a simulation, such as impact on network integrity and sophistication level
of attackers. These parameters are all processed by the model in order to calculate the
appropriate consequence of their interaction. The network model consists of nodes and
4links that represent how the nodes are connected. Each node has a name and a list of
defense mechanisms in use. The output of the simulator simply states whether the attacker
“wins” (by achieving the goal of the attack) or “loses” (if prevented from achieving the goal
of the attack). While Cohen admits that his simulations are unverifiable through comparison
with real world data, experts have agreed that his model was accurate [5].
In 2001, Park et al. [6] presented SECUSIM, a simulator influenced by Cohen’s work
[4]. Park et al. argued that Cohen’s cause and effect model for attack and defense represen-
tation was too simplistic. SECUSIM instead uses a discrete event model with a state tran-
sition diagram in order to characterize attack and defense behaviors and the corresponding
consequences. The attack behaviors were implemented as sequences of high-level attacks
that followed pre-defined attack paths. SECUSIM also includes a very customizable and
user-friendly interface, which enables users without strong computer security knowledge
to run simulations more easily, as well as different modes to choose from in order to best
suit the needs of users with different backgrounds.
Kotenko and Man’kov [7] developed a simulator simply called Attack Simulator in
2003 in order to assess the vulnerability of computer networks during design and deploy-
ment. A strict formal model for attack generation was developed using probabilistic state
machines to model the intentions of attackers. Attack Simulator itself uses a multi-agent
system consisting of Network Agents and Hacker Agents. Network Agents represent the
defense system in place to pretect the target computer network, while Hacker Agents repre-
sent the attacker or attackers attempting to infiltrate the network. Attack Simulator ensures
that the knowledge of the Network Agents and Hacker Agents are maintained separately in
order to properly simulate interactions between the two entities.
1.2.2 Cyber Attack Simulator
In 2007, Kuhl et al. [8] presented a simulator called Cyber Attack Simulator, designed to
efficiently simulate cyber attack scenarios through a simulation modeling approach. Cyber
Attack Simulator represents an alternative to the construction of virtual and physical net-
works in order to test cyber security methods. In addition to the determination of whether
5an attacker’s goals are achieved, Cyber Attack Simulator outputs a set of Intrusion De-
tection System (IDS) sensor alerts that can be used for evaluating cyber security systems.
Cyber Attack Simulator uses a discrete-event simulation model (initially implemented us-
ing the ARENA simulation software before being reimplemented in Java) to generate data
for attacks and IDS sensor alerts. Cyber Attack Simulator primarily focuses on attacks
originating from the Internet, but insider attacks can also be modeled. The simulator maps
attack actions to IDS sensor alerts while also producing noise alerts to represent normal ac-
tivity within a network. After the simulation is completed, output files including IDS alert
files (which contain all IDS alerts produced by the system), IDS ground truth files (which
exclude noise alerts and focus on alerts caused by attack actions), and a Ground Truth Ac-
tions file (which lists the attack actions executed during the simulation and whether they
were successful) are generated.
The computer network model used in Cyber Attack Simulator is Virtual Terrain (VT),
developed by Argauer [9]. Developed as part of a system designed to perform impact
assessment of networks and their components as a result of cyber attacks, VT was motivated
in part by the rising use of IDS sensors in networks in order to detect and report malicious
activity. There are two main types of IDS sensors: network based and host based. Network
IDSs are placed strategically within networks in order to monitor traffic. Host IDSs, on
the other hand, are placed directly on specific devices in a network in order to monitor
incoming and outgoing traffic specifically for those devices. In 2000, Bass [10] discussed
the ineffectiveness of IDSs working independently and proposed a model for cyberspace
situational awareness consisting of heterogeneous distributed network sensors that share
information with each other. Argauer’s model incorporated that concept with cyber attack
simulation in order to test its effectiveness.
VT models networks as directed graphs made up of hosts, routers, and users. In order
to simplify network specification, hosts may have multiple IP addresses in order to define
clusters of machines with the same configuration. Hosts have permission lists that, depend-
ing on how they are configured, describe either a list of machines with which the host is
6allowed to communicate or a list of machines with which the host is not allowed to com-
municate. Hosts also have service trees used to specify which versions of its services are
in use. Routers are not especially relevant in the scope of cyber attacks, so VT simply uses
them to provide connections and a means for communication between hosts. Like hosts,
routers have permissions lists that specify the other machines with which they may or may
not communicate. Users are used to identify the privilege level of services currently acces-
sible on hosts. If the current user does not have a high enough privilege, some services on
the host may not be usable.
1.2.3 Multistage Attack Scenario Simulator
In 2013, Moskal et al. [11] developed a new simulator based on Cyber Attack Simulator
called CyberSim, which was later renamed Multistage Attack Scenario Simulator (MASS)
[12]. This simulator was designed with a plug-in architecture in mind and consists of a
simulator core that interacts with several context models. The Scenario Guiding Template
(SGT) is used to specify the goal conditions of attack scenarios and how to achieve them.
The Attacker Behavior Model (ABM) is used to influence the choices and behaviors of
attackers. Virtual Terrain v2 (VT.2), an extension of the original VT, is used as the network
model.
MASS uses a hierarchical structure in order to represent the attacks in each simulation.
At the lowest level is the attack step, which represents a single action performed by an
attacker during a simulation and determines which IDS sensor alerts, if any, are generated
by that action. Several attack steps make up attack sequences, which represent the actions
an attacker takes from the initial infiltration of the network until either the goal is achieved
or the attack ends in failure. At the highest level of the hierarchy is the attack controller,
which performs setup operations, manages the attack sequences, and determines when the
simulation is complete. The attack controller also manages the noise generator, which
generates IDS sensor alerts that are unrelated to any attack step in order to model regular
network activity.
Once the simulation is complete, the attack controller triggers the creation of several
7output files, including IDS sensor logs, a Ground Truth results file similar to that used in
Cyber Attack Simulator, and another results file that provides more detail on how many
alerts were triggered by each attack step. This attack hierarchy, the context models and
the simulation core make up a single attack scenario to be simulated. MASS focuses on
flexibility and scalability in order to allow for the simulation of many simultaneous attack
sequences using context models that may be incomplete depending on the knowledge and
expertise of the user.
VT.2 is the model used in MASS to represent computer networks. VT.2 is designed to
be as generic as possible and defines all machines in a network simply as nodes, regardless
of whether they are hosts, servers, or routers. Parameters of nodes include IP address,
services in use, IDS sensors in use, send and receive permissions lists, and whether the
node is visible to the Internet. In VT.2, send and receive permissions are specified simply
as lists of nodes. The send permissions list contains nodes to which a node is allowed to
send packets, and the receive permissions list contains nodes from which a node is allowed
to receive packets. Nodes also have a flag that is used to determine whether the node is
a router. There is no need for a special router object, since VT.2 simply models routers
as special nodes that have no services and thus no vulnerabilities. As a result, attackers
that come across a router are allowed to pass through the router to another node in the
network. Nodes also contain sensor range lists for each of their IDS sensors that are used
to determine which sensors in the network generate alerts for each attack step. These lists
are used to model host IDSs and network IDSs in VT.2.
The Vulnerability Hierarchy (VH) is used in MASS to map services running on VT.2
nodes to vulnerabilities that attackers could potentially exploit in order to compromise
nodes and progress through the network. The definition is generic in order to allow for
custom VHs to be used as long as the number of levels in the hierarchy and the level at
which the services reside are specified. The VH implemented by Moskal et al. uses data
from the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s National Vulnerability Database.
Specifically, the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE), Common Plaform Enumeration
(CPE), and Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) classification systems are used,
8where CPEs map directly to the services specified in VT.2. At the top of the hierarchy,
CWEs are grouped into CWE categories. The CWEs themselves make up the second level,
CPEs are grouped by CWE in the third category, and the relevant CVEs for each CPE make
up the fourth and lowest level. Additional entries not covered by the CWE, CPE, and CVE
classification systems were added to the hierarchy in order to account for reconaissance.
The VH is used by the simulation core inside each attack step, which selects from each
level of the hierarchy in succession in order to choose a vulnerability to attempt to exploit
on the selected node. If the attempt is unsuccessful or no vulnerability in the hierarchy
exists on the selected node, the attack step fails and another node is selected.
The SGT is used in MASS to guide the attacker through the specification of the steps
of an attack that must be completed in order to achieve the goal. MASS allows for the
specification of one SGT per attack sequence in order to allow for simulations of attack
scenarios in which different attackers have different targets instead of working toward the
same goal. The SGT defines an attack as a series of stages that are connected by arcs.
Parameters of the stage include whether the stage is a potential starting point for an attack
sequence, whether the stage is the final stage that must be completed before the goal is
achieved, whether the attacker’s choices for attack actions to perform should be restricted
based on the arcs, and whether the attacker should choose a new node from the VT before
attempting the stage. The arcs are used to specify which actions will allow the attacker to
move on from the current stage and the next stage in the progression. If the stage restricts
an attacker’s attack choices, the attacker must switch between currently accessible nodes
and attempt an action from the restricted list. If none of the actions from the restricted list
are possible on the currently accessible nodes, the attack fails. If the stage does not restrict
the attacker’s choices, the attacker is free to attempt any action that will compromise a node
and progress through the network. Stages also specify default arcs to take if an action that
does not satisfy one of the other arc conditions is chosen. This default arc often loops back
to the current stage in order to allow an attacker to continue moving through the network
until an action that satisfies another arc condition is completed, but this is not always the
case.
9The ABM is used in MASS to specify the preferences and tendencies of an attacker.
Like with the SGT, MASS allows for one ABM to be specified per attack sequence in or-
der to allow for simulations of attack scenarios in which attackers with different skills and
mentalities work together. The simulator core combines information from the ABM and
the SGT of each attack sequence in order to determine which attack steps to attempt and
whether they succeed. An ABM contains several parameters, including the probability that
an attack step will be undetected by IDS sensors, the probability that an attacker will dis-
cover a node if it is hidden, the average number of times an attacker will attempt an action
if not successful, and the attacker’s skill in successfully executing exploits. In addition,
the ABM contains optional lists of overall preferred attacks from the VH, preferred attacks
from the VH on a per node basis, and preferred nodes to attack if possible. Each of these
lists may be filled if the relevant information is known or left empty if such preferences do
not exist or are not known.
1.2.4 Attack Graphs
Outside the scope of cyber attack simulation, another method of analyzing network security
is through the use of attack graphs. Attack graphs, first proposed by Phillips and Swiler
[13] in 1998, approach the problem of network vulnerability analysis from a graph-based
approach. Phillips and Swiler model attacks using attack templates, which consist of nodes
representing each state of an attack. Each node contains five fields: user level required,
machines involved in the attack, vulnerabilities exploited in the attack, capabilities of the
attacker, and the state of the attack. Databases of attack templates are combined with
configuration files used to describe the network and attacker profiles in order to create attack
graphs. Cost analysis can then be performed on the attack graphs in order to determine the
lowest-cost attack paths and set up cost-effective defenses.
Phillips and Swiler’s attack graph definition has been expanded and applied in a wide
range of areas. In 2004, Noel and Jajodia [14] proposed a framework for managing at-
tack graph complexity. This work is based on several other works between 1998 and 2004
that involve automatic attack graph generation. The automated process can be used to
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model much more complex scenarios than can be modeled manually, which can result
in extremely complex and potentially unmanageable attack graphs. After defining a new
exploit-dependency representation of attack graphs that is much more computationally ef-
ficient than the previous state-transition model, Noel and Jajodia define a hierarchy of rules
that can be used to aggregate attack graphs. The resulted is an abstracted graph that is much
more usable.
In 2005, Jajodia et al. [15] applied their updated attack graph model in a network vul-
nerability analysis tool called Topological Vulnerability Analysis (TVA). TVA consists of
three components: a database of exploits, a description of the network of interest, and an
attack scenario specification including the target, initial attack control, and changes in the
network configuration. These components are incorporated into an engine used to generate
attack paths based on directed graphs of dependencies between exploits and conditions,
which are modeled using preconditions and postconditions. The output of the tool is a list
of all possible preventative actions that can be taken that have a minimal impact on the
services running in the network.
Noel and Jajodia [16] used attack graphs in 2008 to determine optimal IDS sensor place-
ment within networks. This work utilizes and expands upon the previous works involving
attack graph aggregation and the TVA network vulnerability analysis tool. First, all pos-
sible attack paths through the network of interest that can be used to reach critical assets
are predicted using TVA. A greedy algorithm is then used to place the minimum number
of sensors that can cover all of the predicted attack paths. Once the sensors have been
placed and alerts begin to be generated, the attack graphs are used to prioritize sequences
of alerts that may be indicators that an attack is progressing through one of the predicted
attack paths and use that information to formulate reactive defense actions.
Louthan et al. [17] developed extensions to the attack graph in 2014 to model attacks
on discrete information systems. This new model is called hybrid attack graph because it
leverages the vulnerability space between information systems and a restricted set of hybrid
systems. A hybrid system is a programmed control system that interacts with the physical
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world. Hybrid systems are often modeled by combining finite state machines with differ-
ential equations to form hybrid automata. This work uses hybrid automata as inspiration
to develop hybrid extensions to attack graphs in order to capture blended attack vectors
consisting of both discrete and continuous exploits. In the future, Louthan et al. hope
to incorporate attack dependency graphs into their hybrid attack graph model in order to
improve performance.
1.3 Motivation
Many MTNDMs have been developed over the past decade, but there is a need for a more
comprehensive performance analysis of these techniques. For some techniques, no perfor-
mance analysis studies have been conducted at all. For others, studies have been conducted
that are incomplete or unrealistic and therefore do not provide a complete understanding of
how the technique will perform in a real world setting. Additionally, even if realistic stud-
ies have been completed to verify the performance of a technique, the study will have been
conducted in a different setting from any other studies on other techniques, which makes
comparing techniques very difficult. There is a need for a way to analyze the performance
of different techniques in a common, realistic setting so that more comprehensive studies
of MTNDMs can be conducted.
The purpose of this thesis is to implement a dynamic computer network model that can
provide the common, realistic setting necessary to perform comprehensive, comparative
studies of MTNDMs. DVT allows for the evaluation of the effectiveness of different types
of MTNDMs against different types of cyber attacks, attackers with different characteristics
and preferences, and scenarios consisting of multiple simultaneous attacks conducted by
attackers whose characteristics and preferences may or may not differ. This in turn allows
for a more complete analysis of the relative strengths and weaknesses of different strategies.
Additionally, DVT supports the use of multiple types of MTNDMs at the same time, which
allows for experimentation with using different combinations of dynamic cyber defense
strategies in an attempt to increase network security. The results of these experiments can
then be analyzed to determine which combinations of strategies are the most effective at
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protecting against different types of attacks and attackers.
An implementation of DVT enables the development of a new cyber attack simula-
tor called CASCADES. Based on the architectural concept of the work done by Moskal
et al. [11] in 2013, CASCADES uses DVT as its computer network model, serving a simi-
lar role to that of VT.2 in MASS. However, as its name suggests, CASCADES represents a
slight shift in focus from simple cyber attack simulation. While CASCADES still simulates
cyber attacks, the inclusion of DVT to represent dynamic cyber defense allows for more
experimentation and a wider range of scenario possibilities. Instead of simply comparing
the results of simulations using different types of attacker behavior, CASCADES also al-
lows for the comparison of results of simulations using different network configurations.
The ability to specify the different types of defense technologies in use by a target network
in addition to the capabilities and preferences of an attacker allows CASCADES to provide
insight on the results of much more realistic scenarios than those supported by MASS.
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Chapter 2
Moving Target Network Defense Mechanisms
This chapter gives a brief overview of MTNDMs that have been proposed, specifically in
the areas of port hopping, IP address hopping, and dynamic firewalls. A short discussion
of other types of MTNDMs follows, but these three categories are by far the most common
in literature and as such are the focus of the design and initial implementation of DVT.
Metrics that can be used to evaluate MTNDMs are also discussed.
2.1 Port and IP Address Hopping
2.1.1 Port Hopping
In order to mitigate DoS attacks, Lee and Thing [1] proposed a technique called port hop-
ping (PH) in 2004. The proposed technique attempts to decrease the ability of attackers to
gain information about a network through port scanning by periodically and dynamically
changing the port numbers in use by a server as a function of both time and a shared cryp-
tographic key. Any authorized client should have access to the key and be able to determine
the correct port number currently in use by the server, which allows the server to filter out
illegitimate traffic based on port number.
Lee and Thing’s PH algorithm divides time into discrete time slots of uniform duration.
The current port number in use for a server connection is a pseudorandom function of the
current time slot number and the cryptographic key used for that connection. In order to
avoid synchronization errors between a server and client, there are two valid ports at time
slot boundaries, which are defined with an overlapping time slot factor. This algorithm
is compatible with UDP using the UDP socket mechanism and can be adapted for TCP
with the limitation that once the TCP connection is established, the port numbers in use
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at the end points cannot be changed. They management of the cryptographic keys can be
achieved using either a symmetric key mechanism or Public Key Cryptography (PKC). In
either case, the client must request a key from the server in order to communicate with it.
Lee and Thing propose that PH would be more effective if implemented at the ISP end
of the traffic flow rather than at the application server in order to more effectively reduce
traffic congestion. In this scenario, the server would periodically update the ISP router,
which would be assumed to be a trusted entity, with the correct port number in use. If an
attacker knows that PH is in use, there is vulnerability in the mechanism due to the possibil-
ity of the attacker simply brute forcing attempted connections using random port numbers.
This vulnerability can be minimized be keeping the duration of time slots as short as pos-
sible. In terms of implementation, the proposed approach is the addition of middleware
between the application and socket layers, which would handle key management and the
maintenance of socket connections.
2.1.2 Network Address Hopping
In 2005, Sifalakis et al. [2] proposed network address hopping (NAH) as a mechanism for
protecting data in communications across untrusted networks. This method involves peri-
odically changing the IP addresses in use by communicating end points. The idea behind
NAH is that the interception of information by a malicious agent will be significantly more
difficult if the fact that the communication is taking place between specific end points is
hidden. Even if an attacker is able to intercept some information by listening to the cor-
rect channel at a given time, NAH spreads data streams across multiple communication
channels, making it very difficult for an attacker to reconstruct the entire stream of data.
It would be possible for an attacker to reconstruct the data without knowing the hopping
pattern if the data transmissions were not encrypted, but doing so would require locating
a central network point to tap in order to listen to network traffic, sufficient storage and
processing capabilities, and the timeliness and validity of the traffic being intercepted.
One way to increase the effectiveness of NAH is to reuse any currently inactive channels
to create dummy traffic. This added noise could potentially make it much more difficult
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for an attacker to determine which transmitted data is valid and worth attempting to piece
together. Additionally, since it is difficult for an outsider to determine which channel is
in use at a given time, NAH is very effective in protecting against attempts to distort,
alter, or forge parts of the communication stream. One inherent benefit of NAH is that an
attacker must search for tapping points where network traffic is high in order to maximize
the chance of reconstructing relevant communication streams, which will require much
more processing time and decrease the speed of the attack. One potential issue with NAH is
the synchronization of IP addresses in use between end points of a communication channel
[18]. A possible solution could be to include a mechanism similar to that used in Lee and
Thing’s port hopping, in which two ports are simultaneously valid within a certain window
of the change in active ports.
2.1.3 Random Port Hopping
Independently of Lee and Thing, Badishi et al. [19] proposed a similar algorithm called
random port hopping (RPH) in 2007. Like port hopping, the main goal of RPH is to ad-
dress the issue of DoS attacks. Random port hopping assumes that a secret key is shared
between communicating parties and used as an input to a pseudorandom function used to
choose the sequence of ports to be used. Badishi et al. note that such a mechanism has a
negligible effect on communication overhead when the intervals between hops are realis-
tic. RPH is proposed as an acknowledgement-based protocol with two port-based channels.
The receiving channel always keeps two ports (one current and one previous) open for data
reception from the sending channel, and the sending channel always keeps one port open
for acknowledgement reception from the receiving channel. The ports used for these com-
munications are determined using a pseudorandom function.
All communications on the sending and receiving channels carry authentication infor-
mation, which is generated using a second pseudorandom function. The two channels
share a secret key, different parts of which are used by each of the pseudorandom func-
tions. The sending channel always sends to the most current data reception port of the
receiving channel. When the receiving channel receives a message on the previous port, it
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sends an acknowledgement to the previous acknowledgement port of the sender. Similarly,
when the receiving channel receives a message on the current port, it sends an acknowl-
edgement to the current acknowledgement port of the sender. However, upon receiving a
message on the current port, the receiving channel also updates the ports in use according
to the relevant pseudorandom function. Likewise, the sending channel updates its port in
use according to the pseudorandom function upon receiving an acknowledgement on the
current acknowledgement port.
Badishi et al. also introduce a proactive reinitialization mechanism for RPH in order
to allow new seeds to be chosen based on time rather than on message exchanges. In this
scheme, the number of time units between reinitializations is defined, and the channels
change ports each time the specified number of time units has passed. However, the old
ports are kept active either until a sufficient enough amount of time has passed to determine
that they will no longer be used or until communication is established using the new ports,
whichever happens first. In order to account for the possibility of delay or unsynchronized
channels, the receiving channel opens the new ports a specified amount of time before the
scheduled time that the sending channel will begin to send to the new ports. RPH is a two-
party communication protocol, so each pair of communicating channels using RPH will
share a different secret key and communicate using a different (but possibly overlapping)
set of ports. The network and rate-limiting models used to demonstrate the effectiveness
of port RPH are very simplistic. However, Badishi et al. [20] later demonstrated through
simulations that the use of port hopping decreases the load on the server and that the initial
nave analysis is a good estimate of realistic results.
Hari and Dohi [21] refined the RPH algorithm after discovering a flaw in the original
protocol defined by Badishi et al. in 2010. They pointed out that while Badishi et al. as-
sumed in their analysis that an attacker would choose random ports for each attempted
attack, this is not the optimal approach. When the ports in use have not been exposed,
attacking random ports has a relatively low success rate, and the attacker should instead
choose as many ports as possible and continually attack those ports until the attack is suc-
cessful or the actual ports are exposed. Additionally, there is no reason for an attacker to
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continue to choose random ports to attack in the case in which the ports in use by the sender
and receiver have already been exposed. Against a more intelligent attack strategy, RPH
does not fare well due to the fact that the ports in use are not updated when communica-
tions between the sender and receiver fail. Hari and Dohi propose that RPH would be more
secure if the port numbers were changed even when communications fail. This change is
implemented by keeping two ports open at all times on both channels. Any time a message
is received on a port, that port is updated according to the pseudorandom function in use
by the channels. Any time the communication is not successful, the subsequent message
is sent on the other open port, so the port in use for communication effectively changes in
either case. Hari and Dohi [22] evaluated the dependability of random port hopping in 2012
using discrete-time Markov chain (DTMC) models and determined that their proposed al-
gorithm is an improvement in terms of safety and successfully eliminates the weak point in
the algorithm Badishi et al. developed.
2.1.4 Full Service Hopping and End Hopping
Shi et al. [23] proposed a protocol in 2007 that incorporates both port hopping and IP
hopping, which is simply called port and address hopping (PAH). PAH consists of four
modules: a noise generator, a synchronizer, a data module, and a hopping module. Data
transfer is performed using the synchronizer and the data module. The data module pro-
vides the hopping service, dividing messages into fragments that are transmitted at different
service slots in order to confuse would-be attackers. The noise generator is also used to mis-
lead attackers by generating large noise packets that contain fake addresses and ports. The
hopping module generates address-port pairs for services according to a shared hopping
algorithm. The synchronizer ensures that the server and its clients remain synchronized
using a timestamp-based synchronization scheme.
Based on PAH, Shi et al. [24] proposed an algorithm called full service hopping (FSH)
in 2008. In this algorithm, all service information is changed pseudorandomly, including
port number, IP address, service slot, cryptographic algorithm, and protocol. The FSH
framework consists of a command and control component, a hopping station component,
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and a trusted client component. The command and control component contains the hop-
ping control unit, the hopping tables, and the hopping algorithms. The hopping control
unit controls the hopping stations and defines the above information in the form of a 5-
tuple determined by the hopping algorithms. The command response unit of each hopping
station is used to interpret commands sent from the control center and act accordingly. Each
hopping station uses either a service unit to provide hopping service or a honey pot unit,
which implements a dynamic honey pot system. The role of each hopping station is also
changed pseudorandomly in order to provide an additional layer of security. The trusted
client component consists of a synchronizer, a client unit, and the necessary hopping tables
and algorithms. The synchronizer ensures that the trusted client stays synchronized with
the hopping unit and updates the 5-tuple of hopping information appropriately. The client
unit is used to request the correct server and decrypt the cipher-service with the 5-tuple.
Also based on PAH, Zhao et al. [25] proposed a technique called end hopping (EH) in
2010. In EH, the end information, which is defined as a triple of port number, IP address,
and protocol, is changed pseudorandomly by both ends of a communication channel. EH
leaves open the possibility that different nodes may use different hopping strategies. A mix
of port hopping, IP hopping, protocol hopping, and combinations of the three is encouraged
in order to increase the overall unpredictability of the network. In addition to the traditional
approach of applying EH directly on a server, an alternate approach using a helper node
called a Middle Agent (MA) is proposed. In this approach, the true end information does
not change. Instead, the MA acts as a hopping agent placed between the two ends that
manages the hopping mechanism so the regular network members can function normally.
The MA consists of a control module, synchronization module, and service module. The
control and synchronization modules function similarly to their FSH counterparts. The
service module contains several transmission subsets, which provide channels of commu-
nication between the MA and the clients. These transmission subsets switch between active
and inactive states depending on what server has sent information to the MA and the client
to which that information needs to be sent. This MA approach decreases the overhead of
the system compared to carrying out the hopping on the servers and clients. However, it
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suffers from a major security issue in that if the MA is compromised by an attacker, the EH
technique will be rendered useless and the attacker will be able to freely move to any node
connected to the MA.
Lin and Jia [26] introduced a punching scheme in 2012 in which a client sends a punch-
ing packet to the server in order to create mapping rules in NAT that will allow packets
to be able to pass through effectively. Experimental results demonstrate that the service
rate for clients behind NATs using the proposed punching scheme is 100%. In 2013, Zhao
et al. [27] extended EH to use a new spatial adaptive strategy in order to increase its ability
to protect against sem-blind attackers. The main contribution of this new strategy is the
addition of a list of valid nodes to the central hopping algorithm. The list is initialized to
include all nodes within a system that employ EH as before. However, a new parameter
is defined to specify the maximum number of data packets a node can receive in a unit
amount of time before being considered under attack. If a node is determined to be under
attack, it is removed from the EH list so that it no longer receives updates when hopping
actions are performed.
2.1.5 Spread Identity
In 2005, Phatak [28] proposed an IP hopping scheme called Spread Identity (SI) with the
goal of providing anonymity and DDoS defense mechanisms for communications over the
Internet. SI aims to take advantage of the potential of heterogeneous multi-homing by al-
lowing each interface to simultaneously assume multiple IP addresses across different sub-
nets. These addresses may be dynamically acquired and released as needed, which provides
a significant amount of protection against DDoS attacks. The fundamental mechanisms of
SI are dynamic extended multi-homing, spreading identity by controlling name resolution,
and address resolution strategies. The concept of multi-homing refers to the scenario in
which a node has multiple IP interfaces and each interface has its own IP address. SI ex-
tends conventional multi-homing by allowing each interface to have multiple IP addresses,
preferably spanning multiple subnets. In order to truly “spread” identity, SI modifies the
name resolution process by providing the ability a node within a network the capability for
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“self resolution.” The main strategy used by SI is to keep a mapping of source address and
state to the IP address to return, but any strategy could be used as long it supports multiple
addresses per interface. Phatak proposed a high level architecture for SI, in which the DoS
resilient SI servers include a name resolver, a data and connection request handler, and an
optional challenge issuer, where each of these entities could be either a process within a
single node or a unique node within the network.
Phatak et al. [29] expanded SI in 2013 with a more formal definition of the algorithm
used to support multiple IP addresses per interface within a single node. The fleshed out
architecture of an SI network includes source SI servers (SSI), source SI gateways (SIGS),
destination SI servers (DSI), and destination SI gateways (SIGD). SSIs are used to deter-
mine the associations between private and public IP addresses within the source network,
while DSIs determine associations between host names and routable IP addresses in the
destination network. Each SIGS includes a router and firewall whose NAT entries come
from the SSI, while each SIGD includes a router and firewall whose NAT entries come
from the DSI. Phatak et al. defined an eleven step connection establishment protocol algo-
rithm for SI. First, a source host issues a DNS request to an SSI to resolve the hostname
of a destination. Then, after choosing a public IP address for the source and prompting the
applicable SIGS to create a temporary NAT entry, the SSI obtains the public IP address of
a DSI from a DNS server and sends the DNS request to the SIGS. From there, the SIGS
forwards the request to the SIGD, which sends it to the DSI. Next, the DSI chooses an
available public IP address for the destination host and the SIGD creates the NAT entry to
be used for communications between the source and destination hosts. Then, the DSI sends
the DNS response, which propagates through the SIGD, SIGS, and SSI on its way back to
the source host. Before forwarding the DNS response to the source host, the SSI updates
the temporary NAT entry to enable communications between the source and destination
hosts. Once the DNS response reaches the source host, the process is complete and data
transfer can begin. While this process provides many advantages in defending against DoS





Teo et al. [30] proposed a dynamic access control architecture called Authorization En-
forcement Facility (AEF) in 2003 that uses the concept of risk to determine whether a con-
nection into a network should be allowed or denied. AEF is designed as a complementary
mechanism rather than a full replacement for traditional firewalls due to the unlikelihood
of organizations to replace existing security mechanisms with something completely new.
A network using AEF would still contain a traditional firewall, which would filter traffic
based on a rule set defined by a system administrator. One issue with this type of firewall
that AEF aims to address is the possibility of malicious traffic appearing to be legitimate
based on the administrator-defined rule set and being allowed through the firewall. AEF
mitigates this problem by analyzing incoming traffic and determining the amount of risk
associated with each incoming source. Teo et al. clarify the difference between the tradi-
tional firewall and AEF by pointing out that traditional firewalls perform authentication of
traffic to ensure that only legitimate traffic is allowed to pass through, while AEF performs
authorization on the traffic, analyzing the risk levels and authorizing traffic with sufficiently
low risk levels to pass through. The risk level is calculated based on operations called ac-
tions that can dynamically change the threat level. Teo et al. define actions based on the
characteristics of the network traffic and the contents of received packets.
Hamed and Al-Shaer [31] presented a technique called dynamic rule ordering in 2006,
which optimizes firewall policies based on traffic characteristics. The development of this
technique was motivated largely by previous studies that indicated that in many cases, the
vast majority of traffic for a given network matches a small subset of the networks fire-
wall rules. By separating the most commonly matched rules from the rest and checking
them first, packet matching time is significantly reduced. Additionally, the subset of most
active rules is continually updated based on actively calculated traffic statistics. However,
dynamic rule ordering is limited in that it does not perform well with policies containing
many overlapping rules [3]. Hamed et al. [32] also introduced an algorithm designed to
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optimize traffic rules in order to reject unwanted traffic in as little time as possible and op-
timized the dynamic rule ordering technique using statistical search trees to further reduce
packet matching times.
Motivated by privacy and performance concerns in military wireless networks, Agarwal
and Wang [33] introduced Dynamic Security Policy Management (DSPM) in 2006. DSPM
consists of a monitoring system, a decision-making system, and a switching system. The
monitoring system collects traffic statistics and passes them to the decision-making system
regularly. The decision-making system is modeled as a semi-Markov decision process and
is used to decide which security policy is best given the current state of the network. When a
decision is made, it is passed to the switching system, which handles dynamically switching
security policies. Also in 2006, Acharya et al. [34] described a framework for traffic-
aware firewall optimization that significantly reduces operational cost. This work focuses
on rule redundancies and dependencies in list-based firewalls. The proposed Traffic-aware
Firewall Optimizer (TFO) uses a dynamic feedback mechanism to achieve cooperation
between a rule set based optimizer and a traffic based optimizer. These optimizers work
together to optimize the firewall rule set based on current traffic characteristics. However,
the framework requires a lot of processing overhead in order to work efficiently.
2.2.2 Risk-Based Approaches
Ahmed and Zhang [35] proposed a Context-Risk-Aware Access Control (CRAAC) model
to handle access control in ubiquitous computing environments in 2008. The goal of
CRAAC is to achieve context-aware adaptation, flexibility, and extensibility, all while min-
imizing performance costs. CRAAC uses a risk assessment approach to access control,
calculating risk-based levels of assurance (LoA) to be used for making access control de-
cisions. For each resource, an Object LoA (OLoA) is calculated to represent the sensitivity
level of the resource and the impact if an unauthorized party were to gain access. Then,
whenever a request is received for access, the current attributes of the requestor are used
to calculate the Requester LoA (RLoA), which represents the level of confidence of the re-
source that the requestor can be trusted. If the RLoA is greater than or equal to the OLoA,
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then access is allowed. Otherwise, the access request is denied.
CRAAC consists of two major components: the context management component and
the access control component. These two components are loosely coupled, so changes
made to one component do not affect the other. Determining OLoA values can be done
through simple risk assessment, but calculating RLoA values is more challenging. This is
achieved by identifying contextual attributes that impact the degree of certainty of the trust-
worthiness of an access request, defining LoA values for each attribute, and developing an
equation for calculating the RLoA based on the LoA values of a given requestor. Ahmed
and Zhang define four attributes to be used for calculating RLoA: the eToken attribute, the
access location (ALoc) attribute, the channel security attribute, and the intrusion response
attribute. The eToken attribute represents the resource provider’s confidence level in the va-
lidity of the credentials of the requestor. The ALoc attribute represents the confidence level
in the security of the claimed access location. The channel security attribute represents
the confidence level in the security of the channel connecting the requestor to the resource
provider. The intrusion response attribute represents the confidence level of the provider
in the defense mechanisms in place were an intrusion attack to be attempted. Given these
attributes, Ahmed and Zhang identify two types of relationships between them: the ele-
vating relationship and the weakest-link relationship. The elevating relationship states that
for certain attributes, such as the eToken and ALoc attributes, the combined use of the two
provides a greater confidence level than either attribute could provide on its own. On the
other hand, the weakest-link relationship states that the RLoA should be equal to the lowest
LoA value of all attributes in the set. These relationships lead to the derivation of a group
of equations that could be used to calculate RLoA.
In order to address the problem of weakened security in workflow systems that use
delegation, Han et al. [36] proposed Measurable Risk Adaptive Role-based Delegation
(MRARD) in 2009. MRARD follows four basic steps: risk component measurement, risk
level evaluation, acceptable risk level definition, and the final determination of whether the
risk level is acceptable if certain risk mitigation actions are taken. Han et al. note that
risk is variable in different domains, which influenced their decision to calculate risk level
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using fuzzy logic, a superset of Boolean logic extended to handle the concept of partial
truth, rather than calculate a precise value using a formula. The fuzzy risk evaluation
policy defined by Han et al. includes four steps: fuzzification, inference, composition, and
defuzzification. Fuzzification uses the membership functions of fuzzy subsets for each risk
component to calculate a degree to assign to each fuzzy subset. Inference evaluates the
risk based on each applicable fuzzy risk evaluation policy, and composition composes all
of the results generated in the inference step. Finally, defuzzification uses the fuzzy subset
membership functions to defuzzificate the result generated in the composition phase. Han
et al. note that there are some problems associated with fuzzy risk evaluation. Specifically,
information systems are very complex, so there are almost always additional components
of risk that cannot be modeled. Additionally, the fuzzy logic evaluation process requires
membership functions of fuzzy subsets and fuzzy risk evaluation policies to be defined.
The complexity of these tasks and the need for a well-defined design in each case can be
bottlenecks due to their complexity.
2.3 Other Techniques
While the most work has been done in the areas of IP address hopping, port hopping, and
dynamic firewalls, there may be other MTNDMs that could potentially be used to add addi-
tional layers of security to a computer network. One such technique would rely on the con-
cept of network topology mutation. Network topology refers to the arrangement of and con-
nections between the nodes in a network. Dynamically changing the way a network’s nodes
are connected could make it significantly more difficult for a potential attacker to navigate
his or her way through the network in order to reach a target. At the same time, there is
a large amount of overhead associated with rearranging an entire network. Al-Shaer [37]
described a moving target defense system known as Mutable Networks (MUTE) in 2011
that would incorporate the random, dynamic modification of the IP adresses and routes in
a network for the purpose of cyber defense. However, this initial high-level definition of
MUTE was hypothetical in nature and no experiments have been performed to evaluate the
performance of its underlying algorithms. In 2013, Duan et al. [38] proposed an algorithm
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called Random Route Mutation (RRM). While this method is still in the prototype stage,
preliminary simulations of RRM in software defined networks showed promising results.
Another possible MTNDM would rely on the concept of dynamic assignment of cryp-
tographic keys. Cryptographic keys are used for a variety of applications, including data
encryption and decryption and message authentication. These techniques are used to keep
data and communications private, but if a malicious party is able to gain access to a valid
key, any information that is encrypted using that key is compromised. Dynamic key reas-
signment algorithms could potentially mitigate this risk. In 2004, Chen et al. [39] proposed
a scheme based on a one-way hash function to manage dynamic access control in a user hi-
erarchy. The scheme was able to add or remove classes without modifying the pre-existing
secret keys and randomly change a user’s secret key based on certain security consider-
ations. However, the algorithms used in the scheme are very complex and require a lot
of overhead. Crampton et al. [40] devised a family of generic key assignment schemes
based on existing key assignment schemes in 2006. This hierarchy was then used to cate-
gorize and analyze existing schemes, many of which were determined to be unnecessarily
elaborate.
In addition to techniques like IP address hopping and port hopping, which are intended
for general cyber defense, many techniques have been developed with a specific focus
on mitigating DoS attacks [41]. One such technique is DLimiter, a system developed by
Giralte et al. [42] in 2014. The goal of DLimiter is to use the recent behaviors of users to
sort their requests into one of a set of queues. Users who are identified as having suspicious
behaviors are sorted into a more restrictive queue than those who exhibit normal behavior.
Then, the more restrictive queues add latency to the packets it contains when forwarding
them to the web server. This allows all trusted users to function without experiencing any
disruptions in service that may have otherwise been caused by an attack by one or more of
the suspicious users. The number of queues available can be configured depending on the
needs of the system.
Most of the work in the area of cyber defense has focused on general cyber attack pre-
vention or mitigating the effects of cyber attacks that have already taken place. However,
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there has been some work recently focusing on cyber attack prediction in hopes of find-
ing smarter ways to protect networks from would-be attackers. In 2014, Kim and Park
[43] developed a method of using IDS events to predict the next actions related to pos-
sible attacks. This method leverages known correlations between certain events and the
sequences in which they take place to determine the likely next steps of an attacker after
an IDS event. The preliminary experimental results are promising, but this method is still
in its early cases. One major area to be addressed in the future is decreasing the processing
time needed to predict the next steps, which is currently too large to be viable in real-world
situations.
2.4 Evaluation Metrics
Sandoval and Hassell [44] introduced several metrics in 2010 that can be used to evalu-
ate the effectiveness of MTNDMs. The proposed metrics are not all new concepts, but
Sandoval and Hassell recognized that no standardized metrics for evaluating cyber defense
techniques existed and combined existing metrics with metrics developed by examining
simulation results to form a recommended set. Their metrics focus on assessing the in-
crease in cost to an attacker, the increase in uncertainty that the attack was successful, and
the increase in likelihood of detection and attribution provided by a given technique. A sys-
tem for analyzing these metrics was briefly summarized, but no simulations or experiments
to support the metrics is provided. Four of the metrics proposed by Sandoval and Hassell
were used in this thesis.
2.4.1 Percent of Successful Attacks
The first and most obvious metric to use when evaluating MTNDMs is percent of successful
attacks (pA,success). The formula for pA,success is shown in Equation 2.1, where NA,success







The most basic requirement for any MTNDM is that it must protect the network in
question from cyber attacks to some extent. The extent to which this is accomplished can
be seen directly in the value of pA,success, which will be minimized by the most effective
MTNDMs.
2.4.2 Percent of Partially Successful Attacks
Another metric that is related to pA,success is percent of partially successful attacks (pA,partial),
where a partially successful attack is an attack in which the attacker was able to reach
the final stage before failing. The formula for pA,partial is shown in Equation 2.2, where
NA,partial represents the number of partially successful attacks and NA,total represents the





The rationale for using pA,partial is simple: while the basic goal of cyber defense is to
prevent attackers from achieving their goals, it is also good to prevent an attacker from
reaching his or her target in the first place. If attackers are allowed to reach the network
locations they are targeting, the network is likely not well-protected even if the value of
pA,success is low. While low values of pA,success are desired, low values of pA,partial are much
better indicators that the network in question is well-protected against intrusion. Much like
for pA,success, more effective MTNDMs will consistently produce lower values of pA,partial.
2.4.3 Mean Duration of Successful Attacks
A third metric for evaluating MTNDMs is mean duration of successful attacks (t¯A,success).
The formula for t¯A,success is shown in Equation 2.3, where S represents the set of all suc-
cessful attacks, NS represents the number of attacks that are members of S, N represents
the number of attack phases, and tj,i represents the amount of time spent by the j th attack
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While pA,success and pA,partial focus on the success or failure of cyber attacks, t¯A,success
evaluates defense mechanisms from a different perspective. The goal of cyber defense is
to prevent attackers from reaching their targets and achieving their goals, but this is ac-
complished by increasing the difficulty to the attacker of progressing through the network.
If it is challenging to move through the network toward a target, attackers are less likely
to succeed. However, in the event that an attack does succeed, a good MTNDM should
make the attacker work harder and longer in order to break through. Therefore, while the
first two metrics should be minimized by good defense mechanisms, t¯A,success should be
maximized.
2.4.4 Defensive Effectiveness
Finally, defensive effectiveness (ηdefense) is another metric that can be used to evaluate
the effectiveness of MTNDMs. The formula for ηdefense is shown in Equation 2.4, where
NA,success represents the number of successful attacks, NA,total represents the total number





Once again, ηdefense approaches the evaluation of MTNDMs from a different perspec-
tive than the previous metrics. While it is important to minimize pA,success and pA,partial
and to maximize t¯A,success, there is a cost associated with implementing dynamic mecha-
nisms that modify the state of the network in order to do so. It is important for MTNDMs
to be designed and implemented as efficiently as possible in order for the network to be
able to function properly and for the defense mechanism in question to be worth using. If
a MTNDM protects a network from all attacks perfectly but is so costly that the network
in question is rendered unusable, there is no point in using that MTNDM. ηdefense aims to
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capture that trade-off in numerical form. MTNDMs that allow all attacks to succeed have
a ηdefense of zero. Otherwise, defense mechanisms have a ηdefense greater than zero (and
technically without an upper limit), with reactive defense mechanisms experiencing higher
values than preemptive defense mechanisms. It is also important to note two issues with the
definition of ηdefense provided by Sandoval and Hassell. First, while they call it “defensive
efficiency”, this metric is actually calculating effectiveness, not efficiency. Effectiveness
is a measure of the usefulness of a process, while efficiency is a measure of how well a
process is executed. The two are related, but they are not the same. Second, based on the
formula shown in Equation 2.4, this metric should not be considered a percentage. The
numerator has units of “attacks”, while the denominator has units of “defensive actions”.
Therefore, this is a measure of failed attacks per defensive action that is then multiplied by
100, resulting in a value that expresses “failed attacks per 100 defensive actions.” As is the




In order to support the evaluation of Moving Target Network Defense Mechanisms (MT-
NDMs) through cyber attack simulation, a dynamic computer network model called Dy-
namic Virtual Terrain (DVT) has been developed. This chapter provides a detailed de-
scription of the DVT model. First, the design of DVT and its components is introduced,
including the modeling and incorporation into the network of MTNDMs. Then, require-
ments of cyber attack simulation systems that implement the DVT model are considered.
3.1 Network Model
The design of DVT is based on the same foundation and concepts used to develop VT.2,
the computer network model used in MASS [12]. A high-level diagram of the DVT model
is shown in Figure 3.1. The network is comprised of a set of nodes, which are used to
represent network members regardless of whether they are hosts, servers, routers, or some
other device, connected by access permissions. The nodes may or may not be grouped to-
gether into node groups, which are used to represent subnets in the network. The network
also contains access permissions, information about which nodes are allowed to commu-
nicate with each other. Access permissions link the nodes together to form the graph-like
structure of the network.
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Figure 3.1: High-level diagram of the DVT computer network model.
3.1.1 Nodes
Any host, server, router, or other type of device that can be a member of a computer network
is represented in DVT as a node. The purpose of DVT is to model computer networks in
the context of cyber attack simulation, so there is no need to differentiate between types
of nodes. From an attacker’s perspective, a node is simply an IP address with a set of
vulnerabilities and a set of IP addresses with which it is allowed to communicate. In DVT,
nodes have several properties. In addition to an IP address, each node has lists of the
services it is running, the IDS sensors monitoring its activity, and the MTNDMs it uses to
defend against cyber attacks. Services represent the different programs and applications a
node may be running in order to function and fulfill its role in the network, and IDS sensors
are used to montor interactions between nodes in order to generate alerts for any potentially
malicious activity that may occur so that defensive action may taken if necessary. Nodes
also have a parameter used to specify whether they are externally visible. Any node that is
externally visible can be accessed from the internet, which makes it a possible entry point
into the network for attackers.
A node also has a state property used to reflect how it has been impacted by an attacker
over the course of a simulated scenario. The default initial state is Hidden/Exposable,
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which signifies that while the node has not currently been discovered by an attacker, the
potential exists for the node to be exposed by an attacker in the future. When an attacker
discover’s a node’s IP address, the node moves to the Exposed state. If an attacker is able
to reveal the node’s services from either the Hidden/Exposable or Exposed state, the node
moves to the Services Exposed state. At this point, the node is completely vulnerable to
exploits attempted by the attacker and will move to the Compromised state once an exploit
is successfully executed. A Hidden state is also defined to represent the possibility of a node
existing in the network that is unable to be exposed by an attacker, but since the context in
which these states are defined involves cyber attackers exposing and compromising nodes,
this state is rarely used and really only included in the interest of covering all possibilities.
3.1.2 Services
The services in use by a node refer to the programs or applications the node uses to per-
form tasks and fulfill its role in the network. Examples of services that could be running
on a node include Google Chrome, Microsoft Office, SSH, and HTTP. Recording which
services are running on a node is important in the context of cyber attack simulation for
two reasons. The first is that most services have one or more vulnerabilities that could po-
tentially be exploited by an attacker in order to compromise the node. The second reason
relates to communication between nodes. Nodes communicate with each other through ser-
vices running on both nodes on agreed upon ports, so if an attacker is able to compromise
one node using a vulnerability of a service and the compromised node is able to communi-
cate with other nodes using that service, it will be much easier for the attacker to progress
through the network and compromise more nodes.
3.1.3 Sensors
IDS sensors are used to monitor suspicious and potentially malicious activity in networks
so that attacks may be detected and handled as quickly as possible. In DVT, each node
has a list of sensors that monitor its communications and log alerts whenever suspicious
activity is detected. The scope of which communications these sensors monitor is defined
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by two lists. The receiving range list contains nodes such that when a node in the list is
on the receiving end of a transmission, that sensor is able to see the transmission and log
any related alerts. The sending range list has the same functionality for nodes that are on
the sending end of a transmission. The ranges are defined this way in order to provide the
flexibility to implement both host IDS sensors and network IDS sensors without needing to
define a new object on which to place network IDS sensors outisde of nodes.
3.1.4 Access Permissions
Other than the addition of modeling MTNDMs, the main departure from VT.2 in the DVT
model is the representation of access permissions. In order to simplify the model and
eliminate redundancies, DVT maintains the access permissions of all nodes in a single
centralized structure. This structure can be thought of as a matrix in which the rows rep-
resent receive permissions and the columns represent send permissions. This way, instead
of specifying send and receive permissions separately, they can be maintained through dif-
ferent methods of indexing into the same structure. A single access permission consists of
a sender ID, a receipient ID, and a list of services (and the corresponding ports) the two
nodes are allowed to use to communicate. Depending on the needs of the implementation,
the opposite definition could be used instead to specify pairings of services and ports the
two nodes are not allowed to use to communicate. For cases when the set of services in
use is sufficiently large relative to the set of possible services to use, this may be the more
efficient implementation.
3.2 Modeling Moving Target Network Defense Mechanisms
Since there are several categories of MTNDMs and many techniques within each category,
it may be infeasible to attempt to model every MTNDM that has been developed. Captur-
ing the common traits shared by the majority of techniques within each category and using
those to model high-level, generalized versions of each category of techniques may be a
much more feasible and useful endeavor. There may also be many compromises that can
be made between these two extremes. As such, the DVT model aims to be as flexible as
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possible in order to support whatever type of study is desired. Beginning with a generic
base algorithm to be shared by all implemented MTNDMs, DVT lends itself well to the
implementation of a MTNDM hierarchy that can be used to study the advantages and dis-
advantages of different techniques of any scope. Depending on the scope of the study, the
MTNDM hierarchy can be very deep, focusing on slight differences between implemen-
tations of specific techniques, or more broad, examining the major differences between
different categories of techniques.
3.2.1 Terrain Management
While each node has a set of MTNDMs it employs in order to defend against malicious
behavior, to simply include a list of MTNDMs as a parameter on each node would be a rigid
and impractical design. It is likely that a significant portion of a network would use the same
MTNDMs, so the per-node lists would contain a lot of redundant information. Additionally,
this design could have a negative impact on performance for very large networks. Instead,
it is more intuitive to think of sets of MTNDMs as being employed across some subset
of a networks nodes. In order to implement this design, new agents are needed to take
ownership of a set of nodes and the MTNDMs that operate on them. In DVT, these agents
are called Terrain Managers.
Terrain Managers (TMs) have two major functions: managing the MTNDMs that are
executing on the nodes for which they are responsible, and detecting threats in the network.
These functions are inherently related, since MTNDM algorithms may depend on whether
any threats have been detected or the number of threats that have been detected. TMs
maintain a list of threats at all times, and whenever a change in the list is detected, the
MTNDMs are notified so that they can act or react accordingly. The actual method of
detecting threats is left abstract in the model since different implementations will have
different methods of detecting threats based on the architecture of the system.
The decision-making process for when to update the list of threats can be either time-
driven or event-driven. In time-driven TMs, a period must be specified in order to determine
how often the list of threats should be updated. In event-driven TMs, an overhead parameter
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is specified in order to represent the time it takes to begin the execution of threat detection
algorithm once an event has been triggered that notifies the TM to begin the analysis. The
determination of when these events should be triggered is again left to be defined in specific
implementations since the logic will be dependent on the architecture of the system. TMs
also contain an attribute used to determine whether its MTNDMs should operate on all of
its nodes or only the “affected nodes”, which are defined to be the nodes that are connected
to one or more threats by one or more access permissions in event-driven TMs and all nodes
managed by the TM if the TM is time-driven. Operating only on affected nodes is more
efficient, but operating on all nodes may be safer.
3.2.2 Threat Detection
DVT defines three TM classes, each corresponding to a different threat detection approach.
Each of these uses a different algorithm to assign one of three threat levels to each node.
If a node is determined to be likely to be the target of an attack, it is assigned a high threat
level. If there is no evidence of any attacks targeting a node, it is assigned a low threat
level. In some cases, there may have been reason to believe that a node was the target of
an attack in the past, but that is no longer the case. In this circumstance, a medium threat
level is assigned to the node to reflect the uncertainty from the defense’s perspective about
whether the node is a threat. In general, a TM will operate on any nodes designated with
high or medium threat levels, since if there is uncertainty about whether a node should be
considered a threat, it is safer to assume the worst than to take a chance that part of the
network may be mistakenly left vulnerable to an attacker.
The concept of the threat level of a node is related to, but not identical to, the node’s
state. In addition to the ground truth node states used to track how the node has been
interacted with throughout a scenario, certain TMs may choose to implement threat levels
of nodes in the form of a mapping of nodes to states. In this case, the mapping would
be from the perspective of the defense rather than the ground truth. TMs that implement
this functionality will not have a need for the medium threat level since they have more
complete knowledge of the attacker’s interactions with each node. In these cases, nodes
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in the Hidden/Exposable or Hidden states can be thought of as having low threat levels,
while Exposed, Services Exposed, and Compromised nodes can be thought of as having
high threat levels. However, some TM implementations may not be able to track these
relationships with this amount of detail, instead specifying criteria for grouping each node
into one of the three threat level groups.
The first method of threat detection involves observing the ground truth state of the
nodes to determine whether an attacker has been able to progress toward compromising any
nodes. Since this threat detection algorithm has perfect knowledge of the scenario, the de-
fense’s perspective of node state is identical to the ground truth node state when it is in use.
Likewise, there is no need for the medium threat level when threat detection through node
observation is in use. A node whose state is observed to be Hidden or Hidden/Exposable is
assigned a low threat level, while a node whose state has progressed beyond these states is
assigned a high threat level. This perfect knowledge of the scenario means that for simula-
tions involving networks using threat detection through node observation, the performance
of the defense should be maximized in terms of preventing successful cyber attacks.
The second threat detection method attempts to imitate the first as closely as possible
without actually having full knowledge of the scenario. Without access to the ground truth
state of the nodes in a network, the threat detection algorithm must rely on the best remain-
ing source of information about the network: the IDS sensor alerts. A knowledgeable threat
detection algorithm should be able to match sensor alerts to the type of cyber attack that
most likely caused them. In this way, threat detection through alert observation can make
educated guesses at the current state of a node based on what alerts its sensors have logged.
This information is then used to influence the MTNDMs as in threat detection through node
observation. It is important to note that since IDS sensor alerts can also be generated by
regular communications between nodes in the network, this method of threat detection is
naturally susceptible to inaccuracy in a way that the previous method is not.
The third threat detection algorithm takes into account the fact that the mappings be-
tween IDS alerts and the actions that caused them may not always be available. In this
case, another method of interpreting the alerts must be found. This algorithm interprets the
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alerts in the simplest way possible: by counting them. A user-defined counting window is
defined in terms of number of hours. If the number of alerts associated with a node within
this counting window is higher than a user-defined threshold, the node is designated with
a high threat level. Another lower user-defined threshold is used to represent the condi-
tions necessary for a node to no longer be considered a threat (and assigned a low threat
level). If the alert count is between these thresholds, the medium threat level is used. This
is a necessary form of self-correction used to help mitigate the inherent inaccuracy of this
threat detection method. Two forms of counting are possible: pure counting and weighted
counting. Pure counting works exactly as it sounds, assigning each alert a value of 1 rela-
tive to the thresholds. In weighted counting, mappings between alert and CVE and between
CVE and CVSS score are assumed to be available, which is not unreasonable since these
mappings are freely available on the Internet. Weighted counting uses these mappings to
get the CVSS score associated with each alert and use it as a multiplier to weight the alerts.
This allows for more critical alerts to be taken seriously by the threat detection algorithm
than is possible when purely counting the number of alerts.
For threat detection via alert counting weighted by CVSS score to work properly, each
alert must be associated with a CVSS. In order to accomplish this, existing mappings be-
tween CVE and CVSS score and between CVE and IDS sensor alerts are combined to
create the necessary mapping. However, not all CVEs have a corresponding CVSS score,
which means that not all alerts can be associated with a CVSS score in this manner. In
order to solve this problem, the distribution of CVSS scores in each CWE category at the
top level of the VH was calculated. The three most common scores in each category were
chosen to be used as possible values for alerts in those categories that did not already have
a mapping to a CVSS score, with the final score to be used chosen at random out of the
three possibilities. Even this strategy did not cover all cases, as there were some CWE cate-
gories that did not have any associated CVSS scores at all. For these categories, the values
of a similar category were used where possible, and for the alerts that remained without
a mapping even after all of this, the top three most common values out of the entire VH
were used. The distributions of CVSS scores for each category, which clearly demonstrate
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which three values were the top choices, are shown in Appendix A.
Pure alert counting includes a special case that can be thought of as more of an alert
detection algorithm. By defining the alert counting parameters such that the counting win-
dow is longer than the expected duration of the simulation, the upper threshold is limited
to a single alert, and the lower threshold is set to zero alerts, the algorithm will label a node
as a threat as soon as any alerts are generated for that node, with no chance of recovering
back to a low threat level. This is a very conservative configuration that would theoret-
ically be effective if the defense does not have much knowledge of attackers’ intentions
or information that could be used to interpret attackers’ actions. However, alert detection
would only really be feasible if the defense is confident that noise alerts can be filtered or
ignored effectively in order to ensure that the alerts being reacted to are being generated by
a malicious party. Otherwise, the noise caused by regular network traffic would trigger this
ultra-conservative threat detection algorithm and cause all nodes in the entire network to
be assigned high threat levels, at which point it would be better to simply use a time-driven
MTNDM and not attempt to detect threats at all.
All three types of threat detection maintain threat level designations for each node that
(when in event-driven mode) are used to determine when MTNDMs should be activated
and the nodes on which they should operate when they are activated. However, node ob-
servation and alert observation also track the state of each node from the defense’s per-
spective. Since node observation has access to the ground truth node states, its perspective
of node state is identical to the ground truth. On the other hand, alert observation can
only maintain its knowledge of node states as accurately as possible based on the types of
alerts observed. In either case, this additional knowledge that these algorithms have com-
pared to alert counting allows them to implement an additional feature: cutting off the flow
of updated network information to nodes that are considered compromised. The defense
mechanisms will continue to operate if a node is compromised, but it doesn’t make access
to continue to give that node updated network information when it is under the control of
an attacker. With this in mind, a node’s knowledge its access permissions is frozen once the
threat detection algorithm in use determines that it has been compromised. This means that
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even if IP addresses, ports in use, or access permissions are modified by MTNDMs in the
future, the compromised node will retain the old information and fall out of sync with the
rest of the network. This is just another way in which DVT attempts to hinder the efforts
of attackers to inflitrate the network.
3.2.3 General MTNDM Algorithm
In order to model MTNDMs in a way that will support future implementations of new tech-
niques without requiring additional changes to the system, a general MTNDM algorithm
has been designed. All implemented MTNDMs must follow this base algorithm in order to
guarantee correct execution when incorporated into the model. Like TMs, MTNDMs can
be either time-driven or event-driven. MTNDMs also have period and overhead parameters
that correspond to time-driven and event-driven mode, respectively. When a TM is time-
driven, all of its MTNDMs are automatically time-driven. The same is true for event-driven
TMs and its MTNDMs. However, the period and overhead parameters for each TM and
MTNDM are still defined separately in order to allow for full customization.
The general algorithm for MTNDMs in DVT is shown in Figure 3.2. Once the algorithm
determines whether the MTNDM is time-driven or event-driven, it moves to the appropriate
loop. In the time-driven loop, the algorithm executes the MTNDM logic and waits until the
amount of time specified by the period parameter has passed before repeating the process.
In the event-driven loop, the algorithm waits until a notification that the threat list has
changed is received from the TM, waits until the amount of time specified by the overhead
parameter has passed, executes the MTNDM logic, and waits for the next notification. Both
of these loops continue until the TM terminates its MTNDM processes. The “Execute”
function is kept abstract in order to be defined by specific MTNDMs.
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Figure 3.2: The general MTNDM algorithm used by DVT.
3.2.4 IP Address Hopping
A general Execute function to be implemented by MTNDMs that fall under the category
of IP address hopping has been designed and is shown in Figure 3.3. This function is a
simple “for” loop, operating on the nodes determined by the TM to be affected nodes. For
each affected node, a new IP address is chosen from the pool of available IP addresses.
Then, a temporary variable is used to hold the node’s current IP address so that it can
update its current IP address to be the newly chosen IP address and release the old IP
address back to the pool of available IP addresses in order to be available for use by another
node. In this algorithm, the function used to choose the new IP addresses is left abstract
to be implemented by specific IP address hopping techniques. This will allow for different
mechanisms for choosing addresses to be experimented with without requiring the entire
algorithm to be reimplemented from scratch each time.
Figure 3.3: The IP address hopping Execute function used in DVT.
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3.2.5 Port Hopping
A general Execute function to be implemented by MTNDMs that fall under the category
of port hopping has been designed and is shown in Figure 3.4. This function is a triple-
nested “for” loop. The outermost loop, like the algorithm for IP address hopping, operates
on the nodes the TM has determined to be affected nodes. The algorithm retrieves each
affected node’s receive permissions from the central access permissions structure and, in
the second of the three loops, iterates over each access permission. Next, the function
checks whether each access permission is currently “allowed” in order to determine the
permissions on which the algorithm should operate. If a permission is not allowed, it is
inactive and should be ignored because there is no benefit to changing the ports associated
with it. Otherwise, the innermost loop, which iterates over the list of services associated
with each access permission, is executed. This loop chooses new ports to assign to each
service. Port hopping techniques have an additional parameter that is used to determine
whether port conflicts should be resolved. If they should, the algorithm checks whether
each new port is in use before assigning it and chooses new ports as needed until there are
no conflicts. If not, the first chosen port is assigned to the service and the loop moves on to
the next iteration. Much like the IP address hopping algorithm, the port hopping algorithm
leaves the function used to choose new ports abstract in order to allow for the possibility of
different techniques having different logic for choosing ports.
Figure 3.4: The port hopping Execute function used in DVT.
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3.2.6 Dynamic Firewall
An Execute function for a basic event-driven dynamic firewall algorithm has been designed
and is shown in Figure 3.5. The range of dynamic firewall techniques that have been
developed is very broad, and designing a general algorithm that could serve as a basis for
all of these is not feasible. Instead, this function simply operates on access permissions in
the network based on the lists of threats and affected nodes. This functionality is designed
in the form of a double-nested “for” loop. The function begins by updating the “previous
threats” list, which represents the state of the list of threats during the previous call to the
Execute function, and the current threat list. Then, the two for loops, which are identical to
the outer two for loops used in the port hopping Execute function, execute. In the inner loop
body, two checks are performed. First, if the node in question is in the previous threat list
but not the current threat list, the node was a threat before but is not any more, so its access
permissions should be enabled. If this case is not true and the node is in the current threat
list, this node is currently a threat and should have all of its access permissions blocked.
Figure 3.5: The dynamic firewall Execute function used in DVT.
3.3 Considerations for Cyber Attack Simulation
While DVT is based on the same concepts used to develop VT.2, there are certain consider-
ations that must be made and features that must be implemented in any simulator that aims
to use DVT that are not necessary when using VT.2. There are certain assumptions that can
be made when the target network can be assumed to be static that are no longer valid when
using a dynamic model like DVT, the most important of which involve the timing mecha-
nism used in the simulation core and the level of separation between simulator knowledge
43
and attacker knowledge.
3.3.1 Timing in an Event-Based System
In MASS, networks are defined using the static VT.2 model. As a result, there is not a
need for a strictly enforced timing mechanism, since the only place where timing is needed
is in the generation of timestamps to be used in the output files and for ordering alerts
chronologically in the IDS sensor alert loggers. All threads in the simulation are otherwise
independent, so there is no need to enforce any order of operations through a centralized
timing mechanism. However, implementations of DVT will include MTNDMs that involve
periodically changing attributes of the network, which means that all attack sequences will
need to be synchronized with the DVT threads in order to guarantee that the attacker is
operating on the correct state of the network at any given time. This will require a more
strict timing mechanism that implements a centrally controlled event queue in order to
ensure that all events in the system are executed properly and in order. Rather than simply
executing attacks as the actions are generated, threads will have to generate timestamps
to be associated with their next actions and place them in an event queue, which will be
ordered chronologically. Once a thread’s turn in the queue comes, it may then proceed with
its action.
3.3.2 Attacker Knowledge vs. Simulator Knowledge
In any cyber attack simulation system, access to full knowledge of the target network must
be available. The simulation logic must be able to determine the nodes with which a node is
allowed to communicate, which machines in the network are visible to outsiders, and which
types of attack actions are valid given a current situation. If a parameter of a changes in a
way that affects this information, the simulator must know so it can maintain an accurate
simulation. However, attackers should not be automatically notified every time the network
changes. In MASS, the network never changes, so there is no need to make this distinction.
An attacker in a MASS simulation always has the most current information about the target
network, so the simulation logic was simplified by merging the attacker’s knowledge with
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the knowledge of the simulation core. If this approach were taken in a system using DVT,
techniques like IP address hopping and port hopping would be effectively useless because
the attacker would always know the new IP addresses and ports. Instead, a separate struc-
ture should exist in any simulator using DVT to represent the knowledge of the attacker.
An attacker’s actions should reveal information about the current state of the network, and
that information should not be updated until an action is performed that reveals a change in
state to the attacker. This will allow for proper analysis of MTNDMs, which are intended
to leave attackers with outdated information in order to prevent further attacks.
3.3.3 Interaction with the Network
Whether the target network in a cyber attack simulation is static or dynamic, it is important
that the simulation logic models the interactions between attackers and the network as ac-
curately as possible. Any shortcuts that are taken may make it impossible to generate valid
results in certain situations. In the context of modeling and evaluating MTNDMs in dy-
namic networks, inaccurate simulation logic could render an entire category of MTNDMs
useless in the simulation environment. For example, if IP addresses are not used to identify
nodes, there is no way to model IP address hopping. As new techniques are developed,
more problems for existing simulators will arise in this area. However, as is the case for
generating results in general, a more accurate representation of these interactions will allow




Cyber Attack Scenario And Network Defense
Simulator
A new cyber attack simulator called Cyber Attack SCenario And network DEfense Simu-
lator (CASCADES) is in development in order to support the development and implemen-
tation of DVT and other future works. This new simulator is based on many of the same
concepts used in the design of MASS but will also incorporate new ideas (including DVT),
which will inevitably result in different decisions being made in order to support additional
features. This chapter discusses the design of CASCADES as it relates to MASS as well as
the new features implemented in order to support the inclusion of the DVT network model.
4.1 System Architecture
Much like its predecessor, MASS, CASCADES is designed with a plugin-style architecture
in mind. The essential algorithms needed to manage the interactions between the attack and
defense and the simulation as a whole are contained in the simulator core. All other pieces
of the scenario are implemented in plugin-esque modules known as context models. The
actions of these context models are managed by a central event queue structure in order to
guarantee that all actions are executed in chronological order and that the state of the system
is correct when an action is executed. CASCADES extends the concept of the ground
truth node state employed by MASS by splitting the node state into three perspectives: the
ground truth perspective, the attacker perspective, and the defense perspective. This allows
for a more accurate representation of each parties’ understanding of the state of the system
and their corresponding reactions while still maintaining an internal record of what is truly
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happening throughout the simulation.
4.1.1 Context Models
In its completed form, CASCADES will largely feature context models that are either im-
proved versions of those included in MASS or new additions that have not been included in
previous cyber attack simulators. However, since the version of CASCADES used in this
thesis is the first iteration, some of these context models have not yet been created and will
be the subjects of future works. In these cases, the same context models used in MASS are
temporarily used in order to provide the basic necessary functionality until the improved
versions are complete. Two such cases are the VH and the SGT. The general hierarchical
nature of the VH, in which CWE categories map to CWEs, CWEs to CPEs, and CPEs to
CVE will remain the same. However, the current implementation is very inefficient, so
some future work is necessary to find a better-suited data structure than nested maps. On
the other hand, the SGT will likely be very different in its final form than it is now. The
current SGT design is very inflexible, and it is very difficult to create valid SGTs that will
perform the desired actions exactly as intended. The future version should pursue a more
intuitive architecture while also allowing for further customization if so desired.
There is also much future work to be done with regard to the ABM design, but the
current implementation uses an extended version of the ABM used in MASS. All of the
parameters in the MASS version are intact with the exception of the number of attempts
parameter used to determine how many times (on average) the attacker would attempt an
action. This has now been split into two parameters. The first, node attempts, specifies
the average number of times the attacker will attempt to find an exploit to attempt on a
node. A higher value for node attempts will allow attackers to have more chances to find
an attack that is valid on the current target node, which can be very difficult depending on
the configuration of the system. The second parameter is exploit attempts. This parameter
specifies the average number of times that the attacker will attempt to perform an exploit
on the target node once one has been found. Higher values of this parameter are mostly
intended to be used in tandem with attackers that are not highly skilled and may have
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difficulty executing some of the more challenging exploits in the VH.
The ABM implementation used in the preliminary version of CASCADES also includes
a new parameter: maximum attack duration. This parameter, specified in units of hours,
models the attacker’s patience. While some simple scenarios may allow for attackers to
reach their goals very quickly, a more complex scenario including a dynamic network may
require many attack actions on a single node to keep up with the changing network in-
formation. This may represent a greater challenge than some attackers have the patience
for. The maximum attack duration parameter allows this behavior to be modeled by giving
the simulator core a value to check against the current attack duration. If the current at-
tack duration ever grows larger than the attacker’s max duration, the attack is automatically
terminated and considered to be unsuccessful.
The computer network model used in CASCADES, of course, is DVT. DVT was de-
signed based on many of the same concepts used in VT.2 for MASS, so the implementa-
tions used in the two simulators are naturally very similar from the perspective of modeling
networks. The major difference between the two is the inclusion of MTNDMs in DVT.
However, there are also two notable changes involving the network model itself. The first
is an update to the concept of access permissions. In VT.2, access permissions were stored
on each node in two lists: one representing the nodes to which the list owner was allowed
to transmit and another representing the nodes from which the list owner was allowed to
receive. This structure created duplication of information, as each connection between two
nodes was stored in one node’s transmit list and the other’s receive list. Additionally, the
lists contained only information about which nodes were allowed to communicate with
which and nothing about how they were allowed to communicate in terms of services and
ports. DVT rectifies these issues by relocating what information is stored and where it is
stored. Instead of each node managing its own access permissions, all access permissions
are stored at the network level in the form of a matrix-like structure with the rows repre-
senting communication in one direction and the columns representing communication in
the other direction, thus removing the duplication of information. Also, instead of simply
storing which nodes are allowed to communicate with each other, the matrix also stores
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lists of services that may be used to communicate paired with a list of ports over which
these services may be used to communicate. The result is a structure that provides much
more information about the connectivity of the network.
The second change DVT makes from VT.2 is the creation of an evaluation function
for potential attacks to determine whether the attackers have up-to-date information about
the network and whether the attack would be valid based on the current network connec-
tivity and configuration. This includes the validation of whether the source and target IP
addresses are valid IP addresses corresponding to nodes in the network (or whether the tar-
get node is externally visible if the source IP address is external to the network), whether
the source and target nodes are allowed to communicate with each other, and whether the
service and port chosen for the attempted communication are valid based on the corre-
sponding access permission. The output of the function is a diagnostic message returned
to the attacker containing information about whether the attack was determined to be valid.
Currently, the function simply returns “Valid” for valid attacks and “Invalid” for invalid at-
tacks, but this could be extended to exhibit any desired behavior. For example, this function
could be used in tandem with MTNDMs to further confuse attackers by returning messages
implying that the attack is valid even if that is not truly the case.
A new context model that is very closely related to the ABM has been implemented
to be used with CASCADES: Attacker Knowledge (AK). The purpose of this new context
model is to solve the problem of coupling between the knowledge the attacker should have
of the network at a given time and the knowledge the simulator core needs to have about
the network at all times. Based on the actions successfully completed by an attacker, corre-
sponding knowledge about the target node is obtained. Completing a network scan allows
the attacker to learn the node’s IP address, completing a service scan allows the attacker
to learn the node’s services and their corresponding ports, and completing an exploit to
compromise a node allow’s the attacker to learn the node’s access permissions. Connectors
are a special case; since they are never the target of any attacks, attackers are assumed to
be able to pass straight through them and have access to their IP addresses and access per-
missions. This knowledge is only updated after successfully completing an attack action
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that changes the ground truth state of a node, which is why there is potential for dynamic
networks to be more well-protected against cyber attacks. If the network is able to alter
some aspect of its configuration before the attacker can complete another attack action, the
AK for the target node will contain out-of-date information.
The final context model used in CASCADES is noise generation. While this context
model was present in MASS, CASCADES uses an updated version that is optimized to
precompute the mapping between services on nodes and IDS sensor alerts. Precomputing
this mapping allows the noise generator to select the necessary alerts much more quickly
during simulations, which significantly reduces the overall execution time of a scenario.
Another change that relates more to the system architecture than specifically to the noise
generation context model is that in CASCADES, the noise alerts have the potential to di-
rectly impact the outcome of a simulation. In MASS, noise generation served only to fill
output files with alerts to mimic a real-world IDS sensor’s log file. CASCADES introduces
cyber defense in general to the simulation environment and, more specifically, defines two
methods of threat detection that directly use the alerts from the IDS sensor logs. This means
that depending on the configuration of the noise generation context model, the actions of
the threat detection algorithms and their corresponding MTNDMs may be skewed toward
considering nodes as threats when they are really just experiencing a lot of noise in their
IDS sensors.
4.1.2 Event Queue
CASCADES is a multithreaded program, so proper management of timing and the order in
which events occur in a simulation is very important. When the scenario to be simulated
involves only a static network, the order of operations between actors does not need to be
strictly enforced because there is no direct interaction between the threads that would have
an impact on the outcomes of their actions. The only active participants in static scenarios
are the attacker(s) and the noise generation thread. CASCADES does not currently model
any interaction between these two parties, and a static network participates in the simulation
only passively, so the multithreaded environment serves only to increase the performance
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of the program compared to executing each thread sequentially.
However, once dynamic networks are introduced into the mix, all of the above is no
longer true. Defense mechanisms and attackers both operate on the same network, and
depending on the threat detection algorithm in use, the defense may also interact with the
IDS sensor alert logs to which the noise generation thread writes. This sharing of objects in
the system necessitates a structure that guarantees that only one actor will be operating at a
time, that the order of operations will be correct, and that the system will always be in the
correct state relative to the thread that is currently active. CASCADES accomplishes this
through the use of a structure called an event queue. Whenever a context model needs to
perform an action that will affect the state of the system, it must submit an event consisting
of a timestamp of execution and a reference to the source object to the event queue. The
event queue automatically organizes events by timestamp to ensure that the simulation
actions impact the state of the system in the correct order.
Two user-defined parameters are used by the event queue. The first determines how long
the queue should wait between processing events in order to allow for additional events to
be added to the queue and be organized properly. The second defines how long to wait be-
fore checking the queue for events again if the queue is empty but the attack scenario is not
complete. While the event at the top of the queue is being processed by the relevant context
model, the event queue guarantees that no other events will be processed simultaneously.
This allows for the active event to work with the system in a stable, unchanging condition
except for any changes that it may cause during its execution. This allows for the accuracy
of the simulator to be preserved without compromising the benefits that come with being a
multithreaded program.
4.1.3 Distinguishing Between Perspectives
One major addition to CASCADES that has been largely absent from previous cyber attack
simulators is the distinction between different perspectives of the state of the system. In
MASS, the ground truth state of each node in a network was the only available perspective.
This was considered to be identical to the attacker perspective, and there was no defense
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perspective since the concept of cyber defense was not included. This meant that all simu-
lation results were only valid under the assumption that the attacker had full knowledge of
the state of the network at all times. With the introduction of DVT, this assumption can no
longer be made. The two opposing context models each execute actions about which the
other may not have full knowledge. For example, if IP address hopping is in effect in the
network, the attacker is unlikely to know in advance that the IP addresses of the nodes will
change. Likewise, the defense may not be able to predict the next target the attacker will
attempt to compromise. As a result, there are now three perspectives of the state of the net-
work that must be modeled during cyber attack simulations: the ground truth perspective,
the defense perspective, and the attacker perspective.
The ground truth perspective is exactly the same as the original single perspective of
the network’s state. Both the attacker and the defense can influence the ground truth state
depending on the strategies they employ and the actions they attempt. However, only the
attacker’s actions can impact the attacker perspective of the state of the network, and only
the defense’s actions can impact the defense perspective of the state of the network. As a
result, each side ends up with an incomplete picture of what is really taking place during
the simulation. This is important because it can have a meaningful effect on the subsequent
actions of each party. If an attacker does not know that a target node’s IP address has
changed, there is no reason for the next action to not be an attempted attack targetting the
outdated IP address. Similarly, if the defense is using an event-driven approach and is not
able to detect that the attacker has just completed an attack action that changed the state of
a node, there is no reason for the defense mechanisms to be activated, which results in the
attacker being allowed to progress deeper into the network.
4.2 Simulation Algorithms
While the context models implemented by CASCADES represent the plugin portion of the
plugin-style architecture, the simulator core is the central part of the simulator that contains
the essential algorithms needed to simulate cyber attack scenarios. The major decisions that
need to made throughout the process of simulating cyber attacks, such as choosing targets
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and choosing exploits, are made by the simulator core using input and information from
one or more of the attached context models.
4.2.1 Similarities to MASS
Since CASCADES is currently in development, a preliminary version is used in this thesis
that borrows from MASS, including in the area of the simulator core. However, there
have been some additions and modifications to support DVT. In the main algorithm, in
addition to the generation of observables after the completion of an attack action, event-
driven threat detection algorithms are activated if certain conditions are met. Additionally,
with the addition of AK in CASCADES, this context model is updated after each attack
action. When choosing targets, one major change is in the logic for when to consider a
node not eligible to be revisited. In MASS, any node that had been a target during the
simulation could not be revisited. In CASCADES, nodes are ineligible to be revisited only
if they have been compromised or if the attacker has attempted to perform attack actions
on them without being able to find a valid action to attempt. Choosing exploits is largely
the same, with the exception that the attacker’s perspective of the target node’s attributes is
used instead of the ground truth.
4.2.2 Validating Attempted Attacks
The evaluation of whether an attempted attack is valid on the network is a simple but
important new feature in CASCADES. It was not necessary in the past because MASS
did not have attackers and defenses working against each other simultaneously and did
not force the use of ports very strictly. However, in CASCADES, proper management
of ports is imperative because the defense relies on changing ports as one of its methods
of defending against attackers. The attack validation function begins by making sure the
source and target node of the attacker in question can communicate with each other based
on the network’s access permissions. If so, the function looks for the service on the target
node that corresponds to the chosen exploit of the attacker. Once this is found, the services
and ports specified in the relevant access permission are checked against those that the
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attacker is trying to use to see if there is a match. If any of these steps fail, then the attack
is not valid and the attacker will be unable to compromise the target node. Otherwise, the
attacker’s knowledge of the target node is up to date and the attacker is able to make it one
step closer to achieving his or her goal.
4.2.3 Updating Attacker Knowledge
In CASCADES, the knowledge of an attacker has been separated from the knowledge of
the simulator core and from the knowledge of other attackers, which means that whenever
the attacker completes an action that affects his or her knowledge of the network, an update
function must be called to actually get these updates. This function is shown in Figure 4.1.
This function can execute its main loop many times depending on how many nodes need to
be updated, but initially the update list only contains one node. Once a node from the list
is chosen to be operated on, the function basically runs through a checklist of things that
could possibly need to be updated and updates the relevant ones based on the attacker’s
perspective of the state of the node. Since connectors are a special case of node that are
never the target of an attack, they receive special treatment in this function and always
get what they need. If the node being checked is compromised or a connector, then the
attacker has access to its access permissions, which in turn provides access to additional
nodes that will need to be updated. This process continues as long as there are nodes whose
access permissions are exposed to the attacker. It is also important to note that for all non-
connector nodes discovered in this manner, the attacker now knows their IP addresses and
can attempt to skip the network scan step of an attack on any of them to move straight to
service scanning.
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This chapter discusses the attack scenarios that were executed using an implementation
of DVT, integrated into a preliminary version of CASCADES, that includes high-level al-
gorithms for IP address hopping, port hopping, and dynamic firewall. In this version of
CASCADES, the definitions of the SGT, ABM, and VH context models are mostly the
same as in MASS, as is the attack hierarchy structure. However, CASCADES uses this
implementation of DVT as its computer network model and includes upgrades to the sim-
ulation core logic. First, the purpose of the experiments for which these attack scenarios
were created are described. Then, the network topology, SGT, ABMs, and TMs that com-
bine to make up the attack scenarios will be discussed, followed by a description of the
metrics used to evaluate the experiments and how they are calculated in CASCADES. The
chapter concludes with a discussion of some assumptions that were made and constant
parameters that were used for these experiments.
5.1 Purpose
The primary purpose of these experiments is to demonstrate that the MTNDM-modeling
framework provided by DVT is a viable tool for implementing and evaluating MTNDMs
inside a cyber attack simulation environment. In the process, they may allow for some
preliminary analysis of IP address hopping, port hopping, and dynamic firewall as well as
some comparison between time-driven and event-driven TMs and MTNDMs. However,
the set of experiments to perform is far from comprehensive and is intended to provide a
snapshot of what a comprehensive analysis of these techniques would involve. In addition,
these experiments are conducted with the knowledge that CASCADES is currently still in
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development, so some functionality may be incomplete or contain errors. If this is the case,
any inconsistensies in the results of the experiments may provide some insight into what
these issues may be and how to address them.
5.2 Experimental Context Models
5.2.1 Network Topology
The experimental attack scenarios use a relatively simple network consisting of four routers,
two Windows machines, two Linux machines, an Oracle server, and a web server. The
topology of this network is shown in Figure 5.1. Routers 1, 2, and 4 are visible to the
internet. Router 1 is connected to the two Windows machines, and Router 2 is connected
to the two Linux machines. These four machines then connect to Router 3, which provides
access to an Oracle server and Router 4. Router 4 provides the Windows and Linux ma-
chines with access to a web server and is also externally visible, effectively providing direct
access to the web server from the internet. Each of these nodes has a Snort sensor listening
to its communications as well as a “Reference” sensor, which is a custom sensor defined by
CASCADES that can generate an alert for every CVE in the VH. In the experiments with
dynamic networks, one TM is used to operate on all nodes in the network. The TM uses
one of three threat detection algorithms in the event-driven experiments: threat detection
through node observation, threat detection through alert observation, and a special ultra-
conservative case of threat detection through alert counting that performs alert detection.
For each of these three types of TMs, experiments are performed using the IP address hop-
ping, port hopping, and dynamic firewall MTNDMs. In the event-driven experiments, the
overhead parameter is varied according to certain percentages of the attacker’s action rate
in order to find any trends and relationships that may exist. Time-driven experiments are
also performed for each MTNDM, varying the period parameter in a similar manner.
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Figure 5.1: Topology of the network used in the experiments.
5.2.2 Scenario Guidance Template
The SGT used in the creation of the experimental attack scenarios consists of four stages,
as shown in Figure 5.2. First, the attacker must perform an attack action that falls under
the category of “Reconnaissance” in order to gather information about the current node.
Then, on the same node, the attacker must perform any type of DoS attack in order to
compromise the node. From there, the attacker must progress through the network until the
Oracle server is discovered through reconnaissance and compromised through any means
necessary. Once the Oracle server is compromised, the attack is complete.
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Figure 5.2: High-level flowchart of the stages of the SGT.
5.2.3 Attacker Behavior Models
In order to perform experiments involving dynamic scenarios, a baseline of results for static
scenarios must first be accquired. In order to accomplish this, experiments exploring the
effects of modifying an ABM’s skill level, stealth level, number of node attempts, and
number of exploit attempts were performed. For skill level, experiments were performed
until the value of pA,success reached 0%. For the other varying parameters, five values
were chosen to compare. The values of the other two ABM parameters, probability of
discovering hidden nodes and probability of performing an unknown attack, were left at 0.0
due to their irrelevance given the scenario setup. Additionally, the structures for preferred
nodes, general attack preferences, and node-specific attack preferences were left blank.
Since the network topology is so small, there would likely not be a meaningful benefit
to testing these parameters. Additionally, since the dynamic nature of the networks when
testing threat detection methods and MTNDMs means that the attackers cannot possibly be
entering the scenario with very complete knowledge of the network, it does not make much
sense to fill these structures. For the sake of simplicity, these attack scenarios only involve
one attacker each even though CASCADES supports attack scenarios involving multiple
attackers operating on a single network.
5.3 Metric Calculation
In order to evaluate the experimental attack scenarios, four metrics are calculated through-
out the simulations. The first is percent of successful attacks (pA,success), which relies on
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counting both the total number of attacks and the number of attacks that successfully com-
pleted the goal stage of the SGT. The total number of attacks is simply incremented upon
the creation of each new attack sequence, while the number of successful attacks is incre-
mented after an attack sequence has terminated with a succesful result. The next metric,
percent of partially successful attacks (pA,partial), relies on counting the total number of
attacks and the number of partially successful attacks, or attacks that reached the goal state
of the SGT and failed to complete it. The number of partially successful attacks is incre-
mented when an attack sequence reaches the goal stage of the SGT and then terminates
with an unsuccessful result. Mean duration of successful attacks (t¯A,success) relies on the
number of successful attacks and the combined duration of all successful attacks. The du-
ration for an attack sequence is calculated by saving the simulation time at the beginning of
execution of the attack sequence and subtracting it from the simulation time at the time of
the attack sequence finishing its execution. Defensive effectiveness (ηdefense) relies entirely
on total number of attacks, number of successful attacks, and number of defensive actions
taken. Number of defensive actions taken is the most complex parameter of all, since it
can be calculated slightly differently depending on what algorithms are implemented by
DVT. For these experiments, the number of defensive actions taken was incremented once
for each time a node’s IP address was changed in IP address hopping, once for each time
a node’s ports were changed in port hopping, and once for each access permission whose
state was changed in dynamic firewall.
5.4 Assumptions and Constant Parameters
There are certain parameters, shown in Table 5.1, that remained constant throughout all
experiments either to simplify the types of simulations that would need to be executed or
because they are simply not relevant to any of the experiments performed. These parame-
ters fall into three categories. The first category is application settings, which are not likely
to change often to begin with. “Number of simulations per scenario” defines the number of
times a single scenario should be simulated in order to contribute to the average values of
the simulation metrics. A larger value for this parameter will provide more stable results,
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but the total simulation time is also increased. Due to time constraints, a compromise be-
tween better results and faster simulations was reached using 250 simulations per scenario.
“Allow attack generation” is set to false because allowing successful attacks to be generated
would skew the results. “Noise arrival rate” is set to 0.0 per hour for the sake of simplicity
and due to time constraints, since noise generation significantly increases the runtime of
the simulations. This means that the experiments assume that the network is capable of
fully filtering out noise from the IDS sensor alert logs and that scenarios involving threat
detection through alert observation will be operating only on alerts generated by attackers.
Additionally, as the alert counting section shows, threat detection through alert counting
is configured in these experiments to implement the special case of alert detection, which
labels nodes as threats as soon as a single IDS sensor alert is generated. This is also due
to time constraints, which prevented the experiments from exploring the effects of varying
these parameters.
Category Parameter Value
Application Settings Number of simulations per scenario 250
Application Settings Allow attack generation False
Application Settings Noise alert arrival rate (per hour) 0.0
Alert Counting Detection window duration (hours) 5.0
Alert Counting Maximum allowed alerts before becoming a threat 1.0
Alert Counting Minimum required alerts before becoming a nonthreat 0.0
Attacker Behavior Model Probability of unknown attacks 0.0
Attacker Behavior Model Attack action arrival rate (per hour) 10.0
Attacker Behavior Model Maximum attack duration (hours) 5.0
Attacker Behavior Model Preferred attacks (general) None
Attacker Behavior Model Preferred attacks (node-specific) None
Attacker Behavior Model Preferred nodes None
Table 5.1: The simulation parameters that remain constant in the experimental attack scenarios.
In the ABM category, “Probability of unknown attacks”, which is used to represent the
likelihood of an attacker successfully using a zero-day exploit that is not contained in the
VH, is set to 0.0 in order to simplify the experiments. Additionally, “Attack action arrival
rate” is set to 10.0 per hour and used as a reference when setting all other timing-related
parameters, since the ratios between these parameters are more important than the values
themselves. “Maximum attack duration” defines how long an attacker is patient enough
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to continue to try to achieve the goal of the attack successfully before giving up. This
was set to five hours because preliminary experiments showed that the average successful
attack took around one hour, so any that took over five were likely to fail. The ABMs
used in the experiments contain no preferred nodes or attacks of any kind for the sake of
simplicity and conform to whatever types of attacks are necessary to satisfy the SGT. An-
other assumption that is made in these experiments is that all attacks are external, meaning
that they all originate from the Internet and infiltrate the network through externally visible
nodes. CASCADES has the capability of simulating internal attacks, but this would add




The main goal of this work is to develop a framework that can be used to implement MT-
NDMs and evaluate them in a cyber attack simulation environment. With this in mind, the
focus of this chapter is not analyze the performance of the implemented techniques, but
to demonstrate how such an analysis could be performed. Additionally, since the simula-
tion environment, CASCADES, is still in development, a preliminary version was used to
perform these experiments. Since many of the results seem peculiar and do not necessar-
ily match the trends one would expect to see, this chapter notes these discrepencies and
provides some insight into any possible errors with CASCADES that may be causing or
contributing to them. The chapter begins with some experiments on static networks used
to find the ABM parameters to be used in the subsequent experiments. Then, results of
experiments involving time-driven MTNDMs are discussed, followed by results of simi-
lar experiments involving event-driven TMs and MTNDMs. The chapter concludes with a
section on the limitations of the experiments themselves and a summary of possible issues
with CASCADES that should be investigated.
6.1 Finding a Baseline ABM
Before performing experiments involving dynamic networks to test the DVT framework,
the values of certain parameters of the experimental ABM needed to be determined in order
to maximize the value of pA,success when working against static networks. The parameters
of interest were skill level, stealth level, node attempts, and exploit attempts. In order to
perform the experiments, initial values of each parameter needed to be decided upon to be
held constant while the values of another parameter were being changed. For skill level,
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10.0 was chosen since this is the maximum value and it makes sense that the most skilled at-
tacker would experience the highest success rate. For stealth level, 0.0 was chosen because
each node in the experimental topology had two IDS sensors, which was likely to render
the stealth level parameter irrelevant. For node attempts and exploit attempts, preliminary
experiments using values of 3 and 5 for each were conducted, and 5 was ultimately chosen
for the initial value of each due to a slightly higher success rate. Once the initial values
were determined, the true experiments were conducted.
6.1.1 Skill Level
The ABM skill level parameter is a double-precision floating point value between 1.0 and
10.0. Its value corresponds directly to a CVSS score. If the attacker’s skill level is higher
than the CVSS score of the attack being attempted, the attacker is guaranteed to be skilled
enough to accomplish the attack if it is valid on the network. Otherwise, the likelihood of
success decays at an exponential rate. The results of the experiments testing ABM skill
level are shown in Table 6.1. While the results for t¯A,success don’t seem to follow a pattern,
the results for pA,success seem clear. It is notable that the most common CVSS score is
roughly 7.5, so the large drop off in success rate between skill levels of 8.0 and 7.0 and
between 7.0 and 6.0 make sense.
ABM Skill Level pA,success (%) pA,partial (%) t¯A,success (hours)
10.00 73.20 4.80 1.12
9.00 58.00 13.20 0.99
8.00 46.40 25.20 1.10
7.00 20.80 28.00 1.05
6.00 2.80 5.60 1.12
5.00 0.00 2.00 N/A
Table 6.1: The results of experiments testing the effects of ABM skill level with stealth level = 0.0,
attempts per node = 5, and attempts per exploit = 5.
Additionally, the relationships between attacker skill and pA,success and between attacker
skill and the sum of pA,success and pA,partial are demonstrated in Figure 6.1. This chart
shows a clear positive correlation between skill level and success rate, so the value of 10.0
for ABM skill level was retained as the baseline value for this parameter.
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Figure 6.1: Effect of ABM skill level on pA,success and pA,success + pA,partial for a static network.
6.1.2 Stealth Level
The ABM stealth level parameter is a double-precision floating point value between 0.0 and
1.0. Its value corresponds to the probability that, given the opportunity to avoid a node with
an IDS sensor in favor of a node without an IDS sensor when selecting a new target, the
attacker will knowingly take advantage of the opportunity. The results of the experiments
testing ABM stealth level are shown in Table 6.2. As expected, there does not seem to be
a correlation between stealth level and pA,success in this attack scenario. However, if it had
truly no impact on the results, the results in Table 6.2 should in theory be identical across
rows. Instead, the values are different in each row but very similar to each other. This
suggests that, while much of it has been eliminated, CASCADES still contains a small
degree of randomness that causes the simulation results to be slightly different for each
execution, even if the pseudorandom generation seeds were identical across simulations.
The relationships between stealth level and pA,success and between stealth level and the
sum of pA,success and pA,partial are shown in Figure 6.2. Once again, this suggests that
there is in fact no relationship between the two parameters. With this in mind, the initial
value of 0.0 for stealth level was retained as the baseline value in order to avoid executing
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ABM Stealth Level pA,success (%) pA,partial (%) t¯A,success (hours)
1.00 66.00 7.20 1.05
0.80 71.20 0.40 1.09
0.60 68.80 1.60 0.98
0.40 65.60 3.60 1.25
0.20 61.20 6.00 1.03
0.00 73.20 4.80 1.12
Table 6.2: The results of experiments testing the effects of ABM stealth level with skill level = 10.0,
attempts per node = 5, and attempts per exploit = 5.
unnecessary logic in the code and needlessly slowing down the simulator.
Figure 6.2: Effect of ABM stealth level on pA,success and pA,success + pA,partial for a static network.
6.1.3 Attempts Per Node
The ABM attempts per node parameter is a positive integer that defines how many times
an attacker will attempt to choose an action and use it to compromise a node before giving
up on that node and moving to a new target. The results of the experiments testing ABM
attempts per node are shown in Table 6.3. While there does not seem to be a correlation
between attempts per node and t¯A,success, there appears to be a direct positive relationship
between attempts per node and pA,success. This makes sense, because increasing the number
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of attempts per node will give attacks that would have otherwise failed more opportunities
to succeed.
ABM Node Attempts pA,success (%) pA,partial (%) t¯A,success (hours)
5 73.20 4.80 1.12
4 61.20 2.40 1.26
3 52.00 5.20 1.10
2 32.00 8.80 1.34
1 22.80 6.80 1.06
Table 6.3: The results of experiments testing the effects of ABM node attempts with skill level =
10.0, stealth level = 0.0, and attempts per exploit = 5.
The relationships between attempts per node and pA,success and between attempts per
node and the sum of pA,success and pA,partial are shown in Figure 6.3. It is clear from this
graph that there is a direct relationship between attempts per node and pA,success, so the
initial value of 5 was retained as the baseline value for the experiments involving dynamic
networks.
Figure 6.3: Effect of ABM node attempts on pA,success and pA,success + pA,partial for a static net-
work.
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6.1.4 Attempts Per Exploit
The ABM attempts per exploit parameter is a positive integer that defines how many times
an attacker will attempt to successfully compromise a target with an exploit once an exploit
has been chosen. The results of the experiments testing ABM attempts per exploit are
shown in Table 6.4. Once again, there was not a clear relationship between attempts per
exploit and t¯A,success. However, there was a general upward trend of pA,success as attempts
per exploit increased.
ABM Exploit Attempts pA,success (%) pA,partial (%) t¯A,success (hours)
5 73.20 4.80 1.12
4 76.00 2.40 1.24
3 69.20 1.60 0.87
2 68.00 4.80 1.07
1 68.00 5.60 1.02
Table 6.4: The results of experiments testing the effects of ABM exploit attempts with skill level =
10.0, stealth level = 0.0, and attempts per node = 5.
The relationships between attempts per exploit and pA,success and between attempts per
exploit and the sum of pA,success and pA,partial are shown in Figure 6.4. In general, pA,success
increased as attempts per exploit increased, though not as drastically as for attempts per
node. Perculiarly, the attacker was more successful with four attempts per exploit than
with five attempts per exploit, which does not make sense since any action that can be
completed with four attempts should be able to be completed with five attempts. Because
of this and because of the similarity between the values of pA,success + pA,partial for these
two cases, the initial value of 5 was retained as the baseline value of attempts per exploit
for the scenarios involving dynamic networks.
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Figure 6.4: Effect of ABM exploit attempts on pA,success and pA,success + pA,partial for a static
network.
6.2 Time Driven MTNDMs
The first set of experiments performed using dynamic networks used time-driven IP address
hopping and port hopping, varying the period relative to the average speed of the attacker.
Since the time-driven versions of these techniques do not rely on threat detection, only one
set of experiments needed to be performed. The results of these experiments are shown in
Table 6.5. As one would expect of proactive MTNDMs, both mechanisms experience very
low pA,success values. However, since they are executing so frequently, they also experience
low values of ηdefense.
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MTNDM Period (# attack actions) pA,success (%) pA,partial (%) t¯A,success (hours) ηdefense
IPH 0.5 0.00 12.80 N/A 0.41
IPH 1.0 0.40 28.00 0.79 0.77
IPH 1.5 0.00 35.20 N/A 1.15
IPH 2.0 0.80 38.0 1.04 1.48
IPH 2.5 1.20 42.40 1.07 1.81
IPH 3.0 2.80 26.80 0.73 2.34
IPH 3.5 2.00 50.40 1.04 2.36
IPH 4.0 3.20 52.40 1.00 2.56
IPH 4.5 2.80 54.40 0.99 2.82
IPH 5.0 5.60 52.40 1.04 2.98
PH 0.5 0.00 72.40 N/A 0.96
PH 1.0 0.00 72.40 N/A 1.93
PH 1.5 0.40 72.00 1.04 2.89
PH 2.0 2.40 70.00 0.96 3.79
PH 2.5 3.20 69.20 0.94 4.63
PH 3.0 1.60 70.80 1.11 5.60
PH 3.5 2.80 69.60 0.92 6.32
PH 4.0 7.20 65.20 1.16 6.96
PH 4.5 5.60 66.80 1.05 7.81
PH 5.0 8.80 63.60 1.13 8.18
Table 6.5: The results of experiments testing the effects of varying the period of time-driven IP
address hopping and port hopping with an overhead of 0.05 hours.
Figure 6.5 shows the relationship between period and pA,success for time-driven IP ad-
dress hopping and port hopping, and Figure 6.6 shows the relationship between period and
pA,success + pA,partial for the same MTNDMs. While the values of pA,success remain very
low in Figure 6.5, it can be seen from Figure 6.6 that a significant fraction of the attacks
still reach the final stage of the SGT. However, this may simply be a result of having a
simple SGT and a small network of only ten nodes. Additionally, port hopping seems to
always have the same exact value for pA,success + pA,partial, which is roughly the same as
the baseline value of pA,success. This may be a sign that while pA,success is being lowered,
the overall exposure of the network to potential attacks is not necessarily being decreased
in a meaningful way.
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Figure 6.5: Effect of period on pA,success for a dynamic network using time-driven IP address
hopping and port hopping.
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Figure 6.6: Effect of period on pA,success + pA,partial for a dynamic network using time-driven IP
address hopping and port hopping.
6.3 Event Driven MTNDMs
The remaining sets of experiments involved event-driven MTNDMs controlled by TMs
implementing three different threat detection algorithms: node observation, alert observa-
tion, and alert detection. For each of the three, experiments were conducted for IP address
hopping, port hopping, and dynamic firewall.
6.3.1 Threat Detection Through Node Observation
The first set of event-driven experiments used threat detection through node observation
with IP address hopping, port hopping, and dynamic firewall, varying the overhead relative
to the average speed of the attacker. These results show some surprising and unexpected
trends, which can be seen in Table 6.6. First, for IP address hopping and port hopping, the
value of pA,success actually decreases as the overhead increases, which is the opposite of the
expected relationship. Additionally, for all three MTNDMs, there is a signficant change in
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the value of pA,success after the overhead value crosses the threshold of becoming slower
than the attacker’s actions. If this is not a coincidence, it suggests that there may be some
sort of bug related to the event queue implementation used in CASCADES that is causing
this behavior. At the same time, all three mechanisms experienced increases in ηdefense as
their overhead values increased. This makes sense, because larger overhead values mean
not executing as often, which results in fewer defensive actions being carried out over the
course of a simulation.
MTNDM Overhead (# attack actions) pA,success (%) pA,partial (%) t¯A,success (hours) ηdefense
IPH 0.5 66.80 0.40 1.06 8.30
IPH 1.0 60.40 4.00 1.09 9.90
IPH 1.5 29.20 36.00 1.16 12.22
IPH 2.0 23.60 46.00 1.13 14.24
IPH 2.5 21.60 40.40 1.27 15.77
PH 0.5 41.20 31.20 1.33 9.16
PH 1.0 36.80 35.60 1.31 10.44
PH 1.5 26.40 46.00 1.41 12.89
PH 2.0 21.60 50.80 1.39 14.40
PH 2.5 26.00 46.40 1.30 14.78
DF 0.5 2.80 59.20 1.26 13.95
DF 1.0 6.00 56.00 1.06 14.36
DF 1.5 10.00 53.20 1.15 15.01
DF 2.0 15.20 49.20 1.06 14.97
DF 2.5 22.00 42.40 1.08 15.33
Table 6.6: The results of experiments testing the effects of varying the overhead of event-driven
threat detection through node observation with IP address hopping, port hopping, and dynamic
firewall.
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Figure 6.7 shows the relationship between overhead and pA,success for event-driven node
observation with IP address hopping, port hopping, and dynamic firewall. Similarly, Fig-
ure 6.8 shows the relationship between overhead and pA,success + pA,partial for the same
MTNDMs. As seen in the graphs, pA,success starts out very high relative to the baseline
for IP address hopping and actually drops as overhead increases. The same is true for
port hopping Interestingly, pA,success + pA,partial does not change much over the course of
the simulations and actually remains constant throughout for port hopping. For dynamic
firewall, pA,success starts out very low and increases as overhead increases, which is the
expected behavior.
Figure 6.7: Effect of overhead on pA,success for a dynamic network using event-driven IP address
hopping, port hopping, and dynamic firewall with threat detection through node observation.
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Figure 6.8: Effect of overhead on pA,success + pA,partial for a dynamic network using event-driven IP
address hopping, port hopping, and dynamic firewall with threat detection through node observation.
6.3.2 Threat Detection Through IDS Sensor Alert Observation
The second set of event-driven experiments used threat detection through IDS sensor alert
observation with IP address hopping, port hopping, and dynamic firewall, varying the over-
head relative to the average speed of the attacker. These results, shown in Table 6.7 are
interesting because they seem to show that dynamic firewall was extremely effective, while
the other two offered very little improvement over the static case. This may reflect the
difference in style between dynamic firewall and the other mechanisms. When IP address
hopping and port hopping execute, they are merely changing values of parameters of the
nodes, while when dynamic firewall executes, it is altering the connectivity of the network
on a semi-permanent basis. As a result, the experiments that show dynamic firewall as be-
ing extremely effective may actually just be showing that it managed to turn off all network
connectivity, which would prevent future attacks but at the cost of the network not being
able to function properly.
75
MTNDM Overhead (# attack actions) pA,success (%) pA,partial (%) t¯A,success (hours) ηdefense
IPH 0.5 62.00 2.40 1.08 3.8
IPH 1.0 65.60 5.60 1.22 3.43
IPH 1.5 62.00 11.20 1.27 3.81
IPH 2.0 51.60 14.80 1.31 4.85
IPH 2.5 45.20 20.40 1.35 5.50
PH 0.5 69.20 3.20 1.29 3.06
PH 1.0 68.00 4.40 1.30 3.20
PH 1.5 62.40 10.00 1.35 3.76
PH 2.0 56.40 16.00 1.38 4.34
PH 2.5 50.40 22.00 1.41 4.98
DF 0.5 0.00 42.00 N/A 14.20
DF 1.0 0.40 42.80 1.62 14.03
DF 1.5 0.40 45.60 1.62 14.15
DF 2.0 0.40 46.40 1.62 14.12
DF 2.5 0.40 50.40 0.40 14.10
Table 6.7: The results of experiments testing the effects of varying the overhead of event-driven
threat detection through IDS sensor alert observation with IP address hopping, port hopping, and
dynamic firewall.
Figure 6.9 shows the relationship between overhead and pA,success for event-driven alert
observation with IP address hopping, port hopping, and dynamic firewall, and Figure 6.10
shows the relationship between overhead and pA,success + pA,partial for the same MTNDMs.
Though not as noticeable as in the previous set of experiments, the value of pA,success does
still appear to decrease a bit as overhead increases for IP address hopping and port hop-
ping, which once again may be an issue with the implementation of the event queue and
how different threads interact. As Figure 6.9 demonstrates, dynamic firewall appears to
be very effective. However, given the fact that the results for the other cases do not make
complete sense, the possibility that this is not working correctly either must be considered.
It could be the case that the algorithm is simply too agressive and ends up dismantling the
entire access permission matrix in order to prevent attackers from progressing through the
network. As in the previous experiments involving port hopping, the value of pA,success +
pA,partial remained constant throughout the simulations. For IP address hopping, the value
increased before coming back down, and for dynamic firewall, the value increased as over-
head increased, which was the expected behavior.
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Figure 6.9: Effect of overhead on pA,success for a dynamic network using event-driven IP address
hopping, port hopping, and dynamic firewall with threat detection through alert observation.
Figure 6.10: Effect of overhead on pA,success + pA,partial for a dynamic network using event-driven
IP address hopping, port hopping, and dynamic firewall with threat detection through alert observa-
tion.
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6.3.3 Threat Detection Through IDS Sensor Alert Detection
The final set of event-driven experiments used threat detection through IDS sensor alert de-
tection with IP address hopping, port hopping, and dynamic firewall, varying the overhead
relative to the average speed of the attacker. This is the most conservative threat detection
algorithm, so the expectation would be to see lower values for pA,success and also lower
values for ηdefense due to potentially reacting more frequently than other algorithms. These
expected results are reflected in Table 6.8 to some extent, but this set of experiments suffers
from many of the same strange phenomena as the previous cases.
MTNDM Overhead (# attack actions) pA,success (%) pA,partial (%) t¯A,success (hours) ηdefense
IPH 0.5 0.80 64.80 0.75 8.27
IPH 1.0 8.00 63.20 0.96 7.17
IPH 1.5 12.00 64.80 1.10 6.89
IPH 2.0 18.40 53.60 1.12 7.48
IPH 2.5 16.00 54.40 1.25 7.93
PH 0.5 1.60 70.80 0.92 5.84
PH 1.0 4.80 67.60 0.98 5.85
PH 1.5 14.00 58.40 1.10 5.75
PH 2.0 16.40 56.00 1.18 5.75
PH 2.5 18.40 54.00 1.21 5.87
DF 0.5 0.40 60.00 1.03 11.30
DF 1.0 10.80 57.20 0.95 9.31
DF 1.5 30.0 38.40 0.99 7.95
DF 2.0 31.20 38.40 1.00 7.55
DF 2.5 35.60 35.20 1.07 6.99
Table 6.8: The results of experiments testing the effects of varying the overhead of event-driven
threat detection through IDS sensor alert detection with IP address hopping, port hopping, and
dynamic firewall.
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Figure 6.11 shows the relationship between overhead and pA,success for event-driven
alert detection with IP address hopping, port hopping, and dynamic firewall, and Figure
6.12 shows the relationship between overhead and pA,success + pA,partial for the same MT-
NDMs. As expected, pA,success for IP address hopping and port hopping is very low for this
conservative threat detection algorithm and increases slightly as overhead increases. Inter-
estingly enough, this is one case of port hopping in which the value of pA,success + pA,partial
actually changes slightly as overhead increases, increasing before decreasing back to its
original level. Additionally, this is an exception to the other dynamic firewall experiments
that have been performed because the value of pA,success actually increased fairly steadily.
It is unclear what is causing this, but it could be one or more of the issues proposed as
possible causes of unexpected trends in previous experiment sets.
Figure 6.11: Effect of overhead on pA,success for a dynamic network using event-driven IP address
hopping, port hopping, and dynamic firewall with threat detection through alert detection.
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Figure 6.12: Effect of overhead on pA,success + pA,partial for a dynamic network using event-driven
IP address hopping, port hopping, and dynamic firewall with threat detection through alert detection.
6.4 Experimental Limitations
The set of experiments performed for this proof of concept analysis was very limited. Only
one SGT, one network topology, and one ABM (once the baseline was established) were
used. In order to perform a more thorough analysis, many more combinations of context
models would need to be tested against each technique. This would provide a better un-
derstanding of how different techniques perform in different situations and whether there
are any techniques that hold up well in all scenarios. Additionally, simulations involving
multiple attackers operating on the same network, which is supported by CASCADES,
would allow for further diversification of experiments. These attackers could use the same
ABM and SGT and simply start at different points in the network, or they could use com-
pletely different ABMs and SGTs. Each case would provide more information about the
algorithms being tested.
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Another way to expand on the experiments that were performed would be to experi-
ment with multiple TMs in a single network, each operating on a different subset of the
network.This would allow for increased complexity of the overall defenses. Multiple TMs
could also be used to create uniqure hybrid defense strategies such as using event-driven
threat detection for a MTNDM operating on a node, while also implementing a time-driven
mechanism with a very slow period on the node. This would allow for the same theoreti-
cal benefits provided by event-driven defenses, while also providing the slow time-driven
approach as a precautionary backup in case the threat detection is not able to detect any
new threats and allows an attacker to infiltrate the network. Similarly, some experimen-
tation could be done with a single TM employing mutliple MTNDMs in order to protect
the safety of the network. This would allow for some crude modeling of more complex
techniques such as end hopping [25] using a combination of IP address hopping and port
hopping.
These experiments also would have benefitted from some expansion of the metrics used
to evaluate the MTNDMs. With t¯A,success turning out to be a fairly unreliable statistic in
the context of these experiments, it would have been good to refer to how many steps were
needed by attackers on average to complete their goals. Also, it would have been good
to be able to refer to some expanded information about the results, such as the standard
deviation or the median, especially for t¯A,success since they could potentially provide some
inight into why there didn’t seem to be patterns. Another change could come in the form of
how ηdefense is calculated. While it is currently calculated in terms of entire attacks, there
may be some benefit to calculating it on the level of individual attack actions. This would
allow for a more specific measure of the effectiveness of each defensive action. Another
issue with the formula for ηdefense is that it includes attacks that would have failed even
if no defensive actions were taken. However, there is likely no way to fully remove these
attacks from the calculation.
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6.5 Potential Flaws in CASCADES
The results of these experiments have revealed that there are likely some flaws in the CAS-
CADES simulator core, which is not unexpected since CASCADES is still in development.
One minor issue that definitely exists in CASCADES is a small amount of randomness in
the simulations. Many areas of the simulator rely on pseudorandom number generation for
certain values, but the simulator is set up in a way that is intended to allow the seeds of all
of these pseudorandom number generators to be fully controlled in order to produce results
that are reproducible. However, even when the seeds are set to a certain configuration and
kept there, the results vary slighlty between simulations. However, this is a very minor
issue that is only slightly affecting the results in the worst case scenario and is unlikely to
be the root cause of the strange trends seen in the experimental results.
Due to time constraints, other potential flaws in CASCADES can not be determined for
sure. However, it is still possible to make educated guesses based on some of the trends
of the results. One such trend is a sudden, significant increase or decrease in the value of
pA,success for event-driven defenses. One theory for the underlying cause of these types of
trends is a synchronization issue related to the event queue that controls the order of event
execution. While this should not be the case, it may be possible that the attacker is able
to act faster than the defense to the extent that several events for the defense to react to
attack actions are in the queue at the same time, and then once they all execute the attacker
is longer able to continue with the attack. This would explain the phenomenon in which
pA,success seems to decrease as the defense’s overhead increases, which is the opposite of
what should be happening.
Another trend the results show is that some event-driven combinations seem to not be
effective at reducing pA,success at all. One possibility that could explain this is that it is a
natural downside of event-driven algorithms, which by their reactive nature always allow
the attacker to infiltrate the network to some extent before responding. In terms of possible
flaws in CASCADES, if there is something influencing this case, it is likely in the area of
target selection, where there are two possibilities. The first relates to the way connectors are
treated by the CASCADES simulator core. CASCADES treats connectors as pass-through
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objects that attackers will always be able to pass through to any other node that is attached
to the other end of the connector. It may be possible through some synchronization issue
or simply a bug in the code that the attacker is able to exploit this fact to obtain updated IP
and port information that should not be available without additional attack actions. Another
potential source of problems is backing off to a previous source when the target selection
algorithm reaches a dead end. It could be possible that the attacker is allowed to access the
previous source without updating to the latest node information, which would then provide




The primary contribution of this work is the design of the DVT framework, which has
been designed to be as generic and flexible as possible by providing interfaces and abstract
classes to implement and extend. The two main new features of DVT are the TM and
MTNDM hierarchies, the base classes of which are both abstract and provide everything
needed for concrete implementations of threat detection algorithms and defense mecha-
nisms. As a result, DVT lends itself well to future work, because there are many existing
defense mechanisms and threat detection algorithms that could be implemented. The only
limits on what can be implemented come from the limitations of the cyber attack simulation
engine into which an implementation of it is included.
A secondary contribution of this work is to provide the new computer network model for
the CASCADES cyber attack simulator. The DVT implementation provided for use with
CASCADES is similar to the implementation of VT.2 used in CASCADES’s predecessor,
MASS, with a few notable exceptions. The main difference is the inclusion of MTNDMs,
but there are also other changes such as the switch from lists stored on nodes and dupli-
cating data being replaced by the central access permissions matrix that is managed by the
network itself and not the Node. This work also contributed the new AK context model
to CASCADES, along with the new concept of branching off from the ground truth state
of the network to keep track of three different perspectives: the ground truth, the attacker
perspective, and the defense perspective. This work also contributed to CASCADES the
event queue structure for managing and maintaining chronological order of events in a mul-
tithreaded program. Finally, this work was able to provide a lot of testing and debugging
support to CASCADES that it would not have otherwise received, which has resulted in a
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much more complete and robust application that will be able to support future work.
Based on the preliminary results, one conclusion that can be drawn is that time-driven
defense mechanisms generally experience a lower pA,success than event-driven techniques
but also a lower value of ηdefense. However, these kinds of comparisons are not necessarily
the purpose or desired outcome of this work. If they were, many more experiments would
have needed to be executed in order to perform a truly comprehensive analysis of the im-
plemented MTNDMs. In addition to providing the framework for many future efforts in the
network defense domain, another priority of this work was the ongoing development of the
CASCADES cyber attack simulator. The state of the simulator has improved greatly, but it
is still in development. As a result, the information gathered from the experimental results
has been helpful in theorizing what types of problems may still exist in CASCADES. This
type of information will be very valuable to upcoming works involving CASCADES as it




This chapter discusses future work that could be performed in order to expand upon the
contributions of this thesis. The future work is divided into two categories: that which
relates directly to DVT and that which relates to expanding CASCADES in order to provide
better results for experiments performed using the implementation of the DVT model for
CASCADES described in this thesis.
8.1 Dynamic Virtual Terrain
The DVT model proposed in this work provides a solid foundation of a framework for eval-
uating the effectiveness of MTNDMs. However, there are still some extensions that could
be added in order to improve the initial design and/or provide a more complete analysis of
the strengths and weaknesses of certain techniques.
8.1.1 Additional Experiments
Due to time constraints, the extent of the experiments performed in this thesis is relatively
limited compared to the capabilities of CASCADES and DVT. There is a lot of room to
expand in terms of incorporating additional SGTs, network topologies, and ABMs with
preferences in order to perform a more comprehensive analysis of the implemented tech-
niques. It is possible that the selected combination of context models is an outlier and that
the implemented MTNDMs would perform very differently against an ABM with more ex-
tensive preferences or when deployed on a one hundred node network instead of a ten node
network. Another area with room for more experimentation is performing experiments
with multiple simultaneous attackers. CASCADES is designed as a multithreaded program
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specifically in order to support scenarios with several attackers working against a network
at a time, either together or on their own without even knowing about the others. It would
be very interesting to see especially how the event-driven threat detection algorithms and
MTNDMs would handle working against two attackers at once.
Another possibility with the DVT framework that was not explored in this thesis is
the possibility of deploying multiple MTNDMs on a single network at the same time. It
would be interesting to explore whether any combinations of techniques work better in
tandem than on their own or vice versa. Using multiple techniques would also allow for a
simple model of a more complex technique such as end hopping [25], which is essentially
a combination of IP address hopping and port hopping. It would also be interesting to
experiment with defining multiple distinct TMs within a single network, varying how the
nodes in the network are split between them, and using different parameter values and
MTNDMs in different TM. Finally, there was not much of an opportunity to experiment
with the threshold parameters used in threat detection through alert counting. It would be
interesting to find out what values of these parameters work well to maximize efficiency
without sacrificing performance and how those values relate to the rates at which attackers
perform attack actions and noise alerts are generated.
8.1.2 Additional Implementations
In addition to performing additional experiments involving the currently implemented MT-
NDMs, additional MTNDMs could be implemented within the DVT model in order to be
evaluated. Within the three categories of techniques (IP address hopping, port hopping,
and dynamic firewalls) many specialized versions have been proposed. Each claims to be
valid and effective at performing its task, but while this may be true in a vacuum, no com-
parative analysis has been performed on these techniques. For example, while NAH as
defined by Sifalakis et al. [2] may not require its own implementation due to how similar it
is to the IP address hopping implementation used in this thesis, SI is a much more complex
technique that may achieve better results but may also suffer from a lower defensive effec-
tiveness. Branching out to modeling new types of techniques could be useful as well. Two
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categories of MTNDMs that were not included in the implementation of DVT used in this
thesis are dynamic network topology mutation and dynamic cryptographic key assignment.
While existing works in these areas are far from complete, generic implementations that
capture the main concepts could be analyzed to reach a preliminary conclusion regarding
whether the techniques are useful and how they compare to other types of MTNDMs.
Experimenting with slightly modified versions of the existing implementations may be
worthwhile as well. For example, the implementations of IP address hopping and port
hopping used in this thesis simply choose new IPs and ports to use at random. It may be
worth exploring the effects of using patterns, possibly based on time or some formula, on
the effectiveness of the technique. There may also be additional threat detection algorithms
that could be implemented for TMs depending on the implementation of the system used
to perform the experiments. As evidenced by the differences in results between the threat
detection algorithms used for this thesis, the method of threat detection in use is a very
important variable that can have a large impact on the effectiveness of MTNDMs.
8.1.3 Expanding the Network Model
There are a few ways in which DVT could be expanded from the networking perspective in
order to both provide a more realistic network model and allow for more types of MTNDMs
to be implemented. The first is to implement a mechanism for modeling network traffic.
This is not a trivial task and would take a considerable amount of effort, but it would be
useful for a couple of applications. When implemented for use in cyber attack simulation,
it would allow for a much lower-level implementation of the simulation of what takes place
during a cyber attack. This would lead to much more accurate and realistic simulation
results. Additionally, it would allow for traffic-based dynamic firewall algorithms like AEF
[30] and DSPM [33] to be implemented in the DVT model for analysis.
It may also be worthwhile to incorporate the concept of resources into the DVT model.
Each node in a network may potentially be a resource, own resources, or have access to
resources that are valuable in some way. Some resources are more valuable than others, and
the most valuable resources are the ones most likely to be sought after by cyber attackers.
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With these concepts in mind, DVT could support MTNDMs that prioritize the protection
of resources based on value and predict the most likely targets of attackers. Specifically,
incorporating this concept would allow DVT to support the implementation of risk-based
dynamic firewall algorithms such as CRAAC [35] and MRARD [36].
Another concept related to modeling network traffic that could be incorporated into
DVT is the modeling of communication sessions between nodes. In real-world networks,
connections between machines are not always active. When two machines need to connect
for some reason, a session is initiated between the two. Once the session is no longer
needed, it is terminated. Terminating sessions frees up machines to communicate with
other machines, removes the unnecessary overhead associated with keeping every session a
machine may ever need open at all times, and closes possible security holes that may result
from unnecessary connections between machines. Adding this concept to DVT would
allow for a more realistic representation of how nodes interact with one another, which
would improve the accuracy of simulation results.
There is also room for expansion in the area of evaluating the validity of potential at-
tacks. When an attacker selects an exploit to attempt, the attacker’s knowledge of the target
node’s IP address and active services and their corresponding ports are verified against
the true configuration to determine whether the attack is valid and could possibly succeed.
Currently, the corresponding function only returns whether the attack is valid or invalid.
However, this could be extended to provide more useful messages (such as ”IP address not
found”) or possibly less information than it does now (such as ”Communication failed”).
A more complex algorithm could even work in tandem with DVT’s defense algorithms to
confuse attackers by providing incorrect messages or leading the attacker to believe that
the attack was successful when it actually wasn’t.
8.2 Cyber Attack Scenario and Network Defense Simulator
In addition to extensions that could be added to DVT, there is future work related to CAS-
CADES that would allow for the DVT implementation used in this thesis to more effec-
tively analyze the effectiveness of MTNDMs.
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8.2.1 Scenario Guidance Template
SGTs are used in CASCADES to specify the goal conditions for attack scenarios and the
steps that must be taken in order to achieve them. However, the current SGT structure is
very rigid and difficult to use. Each stage in an SGT must be specified according to the
required format, which is not user-friendly. For users without prior experience in the field,
it can be challenging to create SGTs that are valid and nearly impossible to create SGTs
that actually result in the desired attack sequence being performed in simulations. In order
to increase the usability of the system, a redesign of the way SGT are specified is necessary
on some level.
Another issue with the current structure of SGTs and the way they interact with CAS-
CADES is that the logic for determining when an attacker should move from one node to
another and for determining which node to move to next is currently located in the CAS-
CADES simulation core. While this functions well enough as a default implementation of
the logic, it limits the types of scenarios that can be specified in SGTs. In order to achieve
the full potential of flexibility in the types of attacks an SGT can specify, this logic must
be refactored in a way that allows SGTs to specify alternative decision-making algorithms
when necessary.
8.2.2 Attacker Behavior Model
ABMs are used in CASCADES to influence the choices and behaviors of attackers as they
work to enact the scenarios specified by the relevant SGTs. The current ABM implemen-
tation allows for various degrees of customization in order to achieve the desired behavior.
These degrees of customization correspond with setting the values of parameters used by
the simulator core to execute its attacker logic. However, the attacker logic in the simula-
tor currently assumes that the network on which it is operating is static. This means that
when this attacker logic is combined with a network implemented using the DVT model,
the attacker has no concept of MTNDMs and fails to adapt when they are in use. A smarter
attacker would be able to recognize that MTNDMs are in use and attempt to discern the pat-
tern and how to circumvent it in order to push forward with the attack. Implementing this
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type of attacker behavior in CASCADES would allow for a much more realistic evaluation
of MTNDMs.
8.2.3 IDS Sensors
Another addition to CASCADES that would allow the implementation of DVT used in this
thesis to perform a more thorough analysis of MTNDMs is support for more IDS sensors.
CASCADES currently only has support for Snort sensors, which have alerts mapped to
about 6,000 CVEs. Since there are over 60,000 CVEs, Snort sensors alone are not suffi-
cient for evaluating MTNDMs managed by TMs that use threat detection algorithms that
rely on IDS sensor output. A “Reference” sensor that has an alert for each CVE has been
implemented in CASCADES in order to help alleviate this problem, but since this is not a
real sensor it can only be used to analyze techniques managed by ideal alert-based threat
detection algorithms. In order to reach the full potential of realistic alert-based threat de-
tection in DVT, support for more sensors with more alerts must be implemented.
8.2.4 Reconnaissance
CASCADES currently incorporates reconnaissance directly into the VH as a category at
the highest level of the hierarchy. This allows for the simulator core to treat reconnaissance
actions the same as any other exploit and use the same internal algorithms to process them.
While this has advantages in terms of maintaining a generic system and decreasing the
complexity of the simulation algorithms, it is inaccurate and unrealistic. Currently, two
types of reconnaissance actions are supported by the VH: network scanning and service
scanning. In CASCADES, these types of actions are used to reveal nodes’ IP addresses
and services, respectively, not unlike their real-world purposes. However, they work much
differently in reality than in their CASCADES implementations. Instead of choosing a
node to target, performing a network scan, and “learning” the IP address of the node that
was already selected, a true network scan is more likely to sweep across a range of IP
addresses to see what it can find, which may result in discovering zero nodes, a single
node, or multiple nodes. Meanwhile, the service scan action in CASCADES corresponds
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in part to both service scans and port scans in reality. Port scans function similarly to
network scans in that they sweep across a range of ports to determine whether any ports are
open. A service scan can then be used to attempt to identify the services that are running
on the open ports.
8.2.5 General Considerations
In addition to all of the specific changes that need to be made and features that could po-
tentially be added to CASCADES, there is some future work to be done from more of a
general application perspective. Throughout its history, CASCADES has been in develop-
ment by a small team of students under strict constraints involving challenging deadlines.
As a result, there has not been an opportunity for anyone to work with the simulator purely
from the perspective of testing. It would be extremely beneficial to have one or more dedi-
cated, full-time testers to systematically work through the simulator code and unit test every
context model, as well as the simulator core, as thoroughly as possible. Based on some of
the results presented in this thesis, such a rigorous testing strategy would be very likely to
reveal several bugs in the code.
Another consideration that would have some benefit now but even more in the long-term
future is a full restructuring of how the context models are implemented and how they in-
teract with each other and with the simulator core. The original concept for the architecture
of the system was to implement the context models and simulator core each entirely sepa-
rately and minimize how much one context model knows about the others. This structure,
which would likely be implemented through the use of interfaces, would provide the ability
to swap out, for example, the current implementation of the SGT or ABM and substitute
an alternative context model that implements the same interface. However, the current
implementation of CASCADES has some hard coding of parameters, function calls, and
algorithms that are tailored to the current context models.
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Appendix A
Default CVSS Score Generation
This appendix serves as a listing of graphs used to determine the most common CVSS
score ranges for each CWE category in the VH used in the experiments discussed in this
thesis. For each category, the scores were separated into 18 bins, effectively dividing the
range from 1.0 to 10.0 into units of 0.5. The midpoint values of the three bins with the
highest frequencies after counting each CVE in each category were used as the “default
values” for that category. When a CVE was exploited that did not have a CVSS score,
one of the three default values was randomly assigned to that CVE for the remainder of
the simulation. For categories with no CVSS scores, the scores of similar categories were
assigned if possible. Otherwise, the three highest bins across the entire VH were used. This
process was necessary in order to ensure that the weighted alert counting threat detection
algorithm would be able to associate a CVSS score with each IDS sensor alert.
98
Figure A.1: The combined CVSS score frequencies across all CWE categories.
Figure A.2: The CVSS score frequencies for the “Gain privileges / assume identity” CWE category.
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Figure A.3: The CVSS score frequencies for the “Execute unauthorized code or commands” CWE
category.
Figure A.4: The CVSS score frequencies for the “DoS: crash / exit / restart” CWE category.
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Figure A.5: The CVSS score frequencies for the “DoS: resource consumption (CPU)” CWE cate-
gory.
Figure A.6: The CVSS score frequencies for the “Read application data” CWE category.
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Figure A.7: The CVSS score frequencies for the “Modify application data” CWE category.
Figure A.8: The CVSS score frequencies for the “DoS: instability” CWE category.
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Figure A.9: The CVSS score frequencies for the “DoS: resource consumption (memory)” CWE
category.
Figure A.10: The CVSS score frequencies for the “Modify memory” CWE category.
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Figure A.11: The CVSS score frequencies for the “Hide activities” CWE category.
Figure A.12: The CVSS score frequencies for the “Modify files or directories” CWE category.
104
Figure A.13: The CVSS score frequencies for the “Read files or directories” CWE category.
Figure A.14: The CVSS score frequencies for the “DoS: resource consumption (other)” CWE cate-
gory.
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Figure A.15: The CVSS score frequencies for the “Read memory” CWE category.
Figure A.16: The CVSS score frequencies for the “Bypass protection mechanism” CWE category.
